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Abstract
This thesis presents methods and models for assessing reliability of supply
and infrastructural dependency in energy distribution systems with multiple
energy carriers. The three energy carriers of electric power, natural gas and
district heating are considered.
Models and methods for assessing reliability of supply in electric power
systems are well documented, frequently applied in the industry and con-
tinuously being subject to research and improvement. On the contrary,
there are comparatively few examples of formal reliability assessment mod-
els and methods applied to natural gas and district heating systems. This
work aims at contributing to bridge this gap, considering the structural,
operational and physical similarities and diﬀerences between the systems.
A method for evaluating the reliability of supply in natural gas distribution
systems is presented, based on state-of-the-art reliability calculations from
the electric power domain. Furthermore, a novel modelling approach incor-
porating pipeline storage in reliability evaluation of high-pressure natural
gas pipeline systems is presented.
Parallel energy infrastructures depend on each other at diﬀerent levels, two
of which are addressed in this work. First, by introducing a second energy
carrier in an area dominated by electric power, the type of energy end-uses
served by the electric power system is aﬀected. An optimisation problem
is formulated, ﬁnding the optimal allocation of switchgear in an electric
power distribution system. It is shown how changes in energy end-uses
cause changes in the expected customer interruption costs, which in turn
aﬀects the optimisation problem. Second, the dependency of district heating
systems on electric power is modelled. Network models for the two systems
are coupled, and the consequences of higher-order power system failures are
quantiﬁed for both systems.
v
vi Abstract
The methods and approaches presented in this thesis are demonstrated by
use of simple examples, and applied to test networks and case studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Large parts of today’s energy infrastructure was constructed during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century. In Norway, development of the hydropower
industry has strongly inﬂuenced the current energy infrastructure. Unlike
the general case for most European countries, Norway has traditionally met
most of its stationary energy demand with electricity, including the demand
for space heating and hot-tap water. Cheap and abundant access to electric
power has to a certain degree suppressed the need for other energy sources
and infrastructures. However, after the deregulation of the Norwegian elec-
tricity market in the 1990s, the increase in installed electric power gener-
ation capacity was less than the increase in load demand. This changing
pattern was mainly due to low electricity prices during the period, together
with the fact that the national energy companies were no longer obliged to
meet the load growth. Currently, Norway is a net importer of electricity in
normal hydrological years. The situation has led to a strong emphasis on
establishing parallel energy infrastructures to decrease our dependency on
electricity.
Reliability of supply has become an important planning criterion when
maintaining and reinforcing the electric power infrastructure. Reliability
assessment methodologies are well documented in the literature [1–3] and
are continuously being subject to research and improvement [4]. On the con-
trary, there are comparatively few examples of formal reliability assessment
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models and methods applied to natural gas and district heating systems.
Why is this so?
First, there is a relation between size and impact. It is clear that the electric
power system is and will be the largest of these infrastructures, transport-
ing the most energy and reaching the most consumers. Being the backbone
of most nations’ energy systems, comparison of methods, benchmarks and
failure statistics regarding the electric power system is exchanged between
researchers and practitioners across the world. Second, electricity covers
certain customer end-uses that are not easily covered by other energy carri-
ers. Apparent examples are lighting and computerised systems. Our society
has become particularly sensitive to short-duration interruptions of supply
to these end-uses. Natural gas and district heating systems normally only
cover a subset of all energy end-uses, and one may argue that customers are
less vulnerable to interruptions of supply to these.
However relevant, these arguments do not exclude the need for methods to
estimate the level of reliability in natural gas and district heating systems
as well. After all, the basic goal of these systems is the same; to supply
customers with energy as economically as possible and with an acceptable
degree of quality and reliability of service.
Another aspect inﬂuencing the need for models and methods concerns the
rules and regulations that apply to the diﬀerent energy carriers. As an ex-
ample from the power system domain, several countries have estimated the
costs associated with customer interruptions. In Norway, a speciﬁc regula-
tion scheme is applied, adjusting the revenue of the network companies in
accordance with the customers’ interruption costs [5]. This scheme is in-
tended to guide network companies arriving at an optimal level of reliability.
Appropriate regulations generally provide an incentive to treat reliability of
supply as an important criterion in the planning process, which in turn
boosts the need for accurate reliability assessment methods.
1.2 The SEDS Project
This work is a contribution to the research project Sustainable Energy Dis-
tribution Systems (SEDS). The SEDS project was initiated in 2002 and
is conducted by SINTEF Energy Research and the Department of Electric
Power Engineering at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
1.3. Objective 3
The major objective of the SEDS project is to develop methods and models
that allow several energy sources and carriers to be optimally integrated
with the existing electric power system. Particular emphasis is placed on
distribution systems and integration of distributed energy sources, from a
technical, economical and environmental point of view.
The SEDS project emphasise on the following energy carriers:
 Electric power
 Natural gas
 District heating
Furthermore, as the project concerns local (or regional) energy planning,
the geographical system-boundary typically encompasses a municipality, a
suburban area or a city.
1.3 Objective
This work adheres to the SEDS-project framework. Thus, the distribution
systems considered and their system boundaries are basically as described
in Section 1.2.
The objective of this work is to present and discuss diﬀerent methods and
models for assessing:
a) Reliability of supply in energy distribution systems
b) Dependency between energy distribution systems
1.4 Main Contributions
This work presents methods suitable for assessing the reliability of supply
and infrastructural dependency in energy distribution systems with multiple
energy carriers. These methods were tested by applying network models of
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electric power, natural gas and district heating systems. More precisely, the
main contributions can be summarised as follows:
 A method for ﬁnding the optimal allocation of switchgear in an elec-
tric power distribution system subject to changes in energy end-uses
supplied by the system. Changes in energy end-uses cause changes
in the expected customer interruption costs, which in turn aﬀect the
optimisation problem. Such changes typically occur in areas where
a second energy carrier is introduced along with the existing electric
power system to serve energy demand. The novel part in this method
is the incorporation of changes in energy end-uses in the optimisation
problem.
 A conventional approach for quantifying reliability of supply in elec-
tric power distribution systems applied to natural gas distribution sys-
tems. Structural and operational similarities between the two systems
justify the novel application of this approach.
 A method suitable for assessing the dependency of a district heating
system on supply from the electric power system. Network models of
the two systems are coupled and the dependency is explicitly mod-
elled. This method diﬀers from other published material in the way
consequences of power system failures are quantiﬁed for the energy
supply as a whole. A simpliﬁed thermal power-ﬂow model intended
for contingency evaluation in the district heating system was devel-
oped and applied along with this method.
 A novel Markov-based method for quantifying the impact of pipeline
storage on the reliability of supply in pipeline energy systems. The
concept of storage failure rate is introduced.
 Several basic examples are presented to demonstrate the modelling
approaches and discuss the simplifying assumptions. In addition, most
of the presented models are applied to larger test systems or case
studies.
1.5 List of Publications
The main contributions of this thesis are presented in Publications A-D
listed below. These publications are presented in Appendix B.
1.6. Thesis Outline 5
 Publication A: A. Helseth and A. T. Holen. Impact of Energy
End-use and Customer Interruption Cost on Optimal Allocation of
Switchgear in Constrained Distribution Networks. IEEE Transactions
on Power Delivery, accepted for future publication.
 Publication B: A. Helseth and A. T. Holen. Reliability Modeling
of Gas and Electric Power Distribution Systems; Similarities and Dif-
ferences. In Proc. of 9th International Conference on Probabilistic
Methods Applied to Power Systems, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006.
 Publication C: A. Helseth and A. T. Holen. Structural Vulnerability
of Energy Distribution Systems; Incorporating Infrastructural Depen-
dencies. Accepted for presentation at 16th Power Systems Computa-
tion Conference, Glasgow, Scotland, 2008.
 Publication D: A. Helseth and G. Koeppel. Pipeline Storage and
its Impact on Reliability of Supply in Pipeline Energy Systems. Reli-
ability Engineering & System Safety, in review.
Besides, the following two publications are early, and slightly diﬀerent, ver-
sions of publications A and D:
 A. Helseth and A. T. Holen. Impact of Energy End-use on Optimal
Allocation of Switchgear in Radial Distribution Networks. In Proc.
of 3rd International Symposium on Modern Electric Power Systems,
Wroc law, Poland, 2006.
 A. Helseth and G. Koeppel. Storage Potential in Pipelines and its
Impact on Reliability of Supply. In Proc. of the European Safety and
Reliability Conference, Stavanger, Norway, 2007.
1.6 Thesis Outline
Publications A-D, as listed in Section 1.5, are introduced in Chapters 2 - 5.
The energy distribution systems of electric power, natural gas and district
heating are addressed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively. These chapters
discuss the essential structural and operational topologies of each system,
focusing on similarities and diﬀerences between the systems which are rele-
vant for the presented models and methods.
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It should be noted that the chapters do not fully summarise the ﬁndings
in the publications. They rather serve as introductions to their associated
publication, without reproducing the case-study results in the publications.
Some of the chapters also contain supplemental material and examples.
Thus, it is recommended to read each chapter and its associated publication
in conjunction. A brief description of each chapter is given below.
Chapter 2: concerns the electric power distribution system and serves as a
background for Publication A. A method for ﬁnding optimal allocation
of switchgear is presented.
Chapter 3: concerns the natural gas distribution system and serves as
a background and supplement to the reliability evaluation approach
presented in Publication B.
Chapter 4: concerns the district heating system and describes a thermal
power-ﬂow model suitable for contingency analysis as performed in
Publication C.
Chapter 5: concerns pipeline storage in natural gas pipeline systems and
its impact on reliability of supply. This chapter serves as a background
and supplement to Publication D.
Chapter 6: concludes the thesis by summarising the major achievements,
discussing potential applications and suggesting possible future work.
1.7 Network Modelling Notation
The purpose of this section is to introduce the basic network modelling
notation used throughout this thesis.
The topology of an energy distribution system can be represented by a graph
G comprising a set of nodes N and branches B. A branch connects a pair
of distinct nodes.
Nodes are indexed i and branches b in the subsequent chapters, and there
are N nodes and B branches in the sets N and B, respectively.
i ∈ N = {1, ..., i, ...,N}
b ∈ B = {1, ..., b, ..., B}
1.7. Network Modelling Notation 7
The graph G represents only the topology of a distribution system, and
gives no further information about its elements. When adding additional,
quantitative information to the graph, it is referred to as a network.
Lines, cables, pipelines, compressors, pumps, valves and switches are typical
representations and subclasses of a branch.
Load points, junctions and generators are typical representations and sub-
classes of a node. Load point nodes are in a subset NL ⊆ N . Similarly,
electric and thermal power generation nodes are in a subset NG ⊆ N .
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Chapter 2
Electric Power Distribution
Systems
Publication A
The first part of this chapter provides a perspective on reliability modelling
in electric power distribution systems. First, the hierarchical levels com-
monly applied in reliability evaluation of electric power systems are pre-
sented. The scope is then narrowed to the distribution system and the mod-
elling techniques and assumptions applied in Publication A are explained.
It is described how the impact of changes in energy end-use on customer
interruption costs was quantified in Publication A.
2.1 Reliability Modelling and Hierarchical Levels
Today’s electric power systems (EPS) are complex interconnected systems
commonly being divided into four major parts; generation, transmission,
distribution and loads. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the interrelation of the various
networks and the connection of generators and loads. The transmission sys-
tem is used to transfer large amounts of energy from the main generation
area to major load centres. The extra-high voltage (EHV) and the high volt-
age (HV) levels are considered parts of the transmission system. In Fig. 2.1,
the distribution systems comprise two diﬀerent voltage levels, the medium
voltage (MV) and low voltage (LV). The HV and MV networks provide
9
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∼
∼
∼
∼
∼
EHV EHV/HV HV HV/MV MV LV
Import/Export
Figure 2.1: Illustration of an electrical power system ( = MV/LV substa-
tion and • = load point).
supplies direct to large customers, but the vast majority of customers are
connected at LV and supplied via MV/LV substations.
Techniques for power system reliability analysis are normally categorised in
terms of their application to diﬀerent parts of the power system [6]. The
power system may be divided in three diﬀerent functional zones, relating
to generation, transmission and distribution facilities. Reliability studies
are conducted within functional zones or within a hierarchical level. Hier-
archical levels are combinations of zones as described in [6] and shown in
Fig. 2.2. Hierarchical level I (HLI) is only concerned with the generation
facilities, hierarchical level II (HLII) includes both generation and trans-
mission facilities and hierarchical level III (HLIII) includes all functional
zones. Assessing the reliability of the entire power system as one single en-
tity would be exhaustive and make meaningful data interpretation diﬃcult.
Therefore, studies aimed at HLIII are normally performed for the distribu-
tion functional zone only. In case a complete HLIII study is wanted, results
from reliability studies at HLII may serve as input to reliability studies in
the distribution functional zone [2].
Failures of facilities in the generation and transmission functional zones may
cause widespread system consequences. For this reason, a majority of the
research eﬀort has been aimed at improving techniques for reliability assess-
ment of HLI and HLII. Comparatively, distribution systems have received
less attention. However, the fact that distribution facilities have greater
average eﬀect on loss of supply to customers than generation and transmis-
sion facilities, necessitates accurate reliability assessment techniques for this
2.2. Distribution System Operation 11
Generation Facilities
Transmission Facilities
Distribution Facilities
Hierarchical Level I
Hierarchical Level II
Hierarchical Level III
Figure 2.2: Functional zones and hierarchical levels.
domain as well.
The remaining part of this chapter concerns radially operated Electric Power
Distribution Systems (EPDS) at MV level. First, some basic operational
concepts and modelling techniques are discussed.
2.2 Distribution System Operation
The structural topology of an EPDS varies from the pure radial system in
rural areas to highly meshed systems in urban areas. Most distribution sys-
tem operators (DSOs) choose to operate the system radially. Considering
power losses and voltage drops, it would be beneﬁcial to apply a meshed op-
erational topology whenever possible. However, as protection arrangements
are simpler, voltage control is easier and fault levels are lower, the preferred
operational topology is normally the radial one [7]. The techniques applied
in the remainder of this chapter are aimed at radially operated EPDSs.
2.3 Switchgear and System Protection
A wide variety of switchgear and protective devices may be applied in an
EPDS. Below is a brief and general introduction to the devices considered
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in Publication A, and the assumptions regarding their locations.
Consider the EPDS radial shown in Fig. 2.3, containing fuses (f1-f3), a
circuit breaker (CB) and switches (s1-s5). Fuses are overcurrent protection
devices. Once a fuse has melted and operated due to a downstream fault, it
requires replacement before the protected branch can carry load again. It
is assumed that no fuse has switchgear located downstream of it. A circuit
breaker has the ability to break fault currents and is located at the sending
end of each branch leaving the HV/MV substation.
Two types of switches are considered; the automatically1 operated (AOS)
and the manually operated switch (MOS). An AOS will automatically iso-
late a permanently faulted section of a distribution circuit once an upstream
circuit breaker has interrupted the fault current. In contrast, the MOS re-
quires the presence of a repair crew in order to be operated. It is clear that
an EPDS containing AOSs will provide faster failure isolation and network
reconﬁguration than would be the case for MOSs. However, as neither of
these has the ability to break fault currents, the type of switch will not
inﬂuence the frequency of interruptions experienced by customers.
2.4 Basic Reliability Indices
The system shown in Fig. 2.3 illustrates a simple EPDS radial. The ra-
dial receives power from an HV/MV substation to feed load points LA-LC .
These load points represent the aggregation of loads connected to the un-
derlying LV network, downstream MV/LV transformers ta-tc. EPDS cables
and lines are either classiﬁed as terminal or primary branches. Terminal
branches (a-c) have no downstream connected MV cables or lines and are
equipped with fuses at their sending ends. Primary branches (1-3) are not
directly connected to MV/LV transformers and may have switches at both
their sending and receiving ends.
The reliability assessment procedure is based on the following assumptions:
 only ﬁrst-order permanent failures are considered;
1Automatic switches could be replaced with remote controlled switches in the presented
method. One could loosely speak of one fast (automatic or remote control) and one slow
(manual control) switch.
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HV/MV
CB
NOs1 s2 s3 s4 s5
f1 f2 f3
1 2 3
a b c
ta tb tc
LA LB LC
Figure 2.3: An electric power distribution system radial.
 all switchgear is fully reliable and properly coordinated.
2.4.1 Without Load Transfer
Consider the radial in Fig. 2.3 without any load transfer possibilities. In
case the primary branch labelled 2 fails, the CB will open and de-energise
the entire radial, interrupting supply to all load points. Subsequently, the
switches s2 and s3 are used to isolate the faulted branch. Now CB is reset
and supply to LA is restored. LB and LC will not have their supply restored
before branch 2 has been repaired.
For EPDS radials similar to the one in Fig. 2.3, the basic reliability param-
eters of average interruption rate λi, average annual outage time Ui and
average outage time ri for each load point i are found directly from (2.1).
λi =
∑
α∈S1
λα +
∑
β∈S2
λβ (2.1a)
Ui =
∑
α∈S1
λαrα +
∑
β∈S2
λβs (2.1b)
ri =
Ui
λi
(2.1c)
where:
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S1 = set of components upstream from load point i
S2 = set of primary branches downstream from load point i
λ{α,β} = average failure rate of component {α, β}
rα = repair time of component α
s = sectionalising time
2.4.2 With Load Transfer
Now we assume that it is possible to supply all load connected to the radial
through an adjacent radial by closing a normally open switch (NO), as
illustrated with the dotted line in Fig. 2.3. Equations (2.1) still apply, but
the sets S1 and S2 need to be redeﬁned for each load point as follows. S1
will now comprise the set of components downstream the fuse protecting
the terminal branch serving load point i. Evaluating LB, S1 will contain
components b and tb. S2 will contain all primary branches on the radial,
i.e. branches 1-3. Consequently, the average interruption rates will not
be aﬀected by the inclusion of a load transfer possibility, but the average
annual outage times will decrease for all load points.
2.4.3 With Load Transfer and Network Constraints
In some cases, the ability to transfer load to another radial can be lim-
ited due to network constraints. Nodal voltages and branch currents must
be within a predeﬁned range in order to suﬃciently supply customers and
avoid equipment damages. For each load point i and each branch b, the
voltages and currents must meet their corresponding minimum (Vmin) and
maximum (Ib,max) constraints in (2.2). In order to control that network
constraints are not violated, an algorithm for computing the power ﬂow in
radial EPDS was applied, as described in [8].
∀i ∈ NL : Vi ≥ Vmin (2.2a)
∀b ∈ B : Ib ≤ Ib,max (2.2b)
Treating network constraints in a reliability model is not straightforward and
depends, among other things, on utility practises and available switchgear.
Consider a permanent failure of branch 1, as illustrated in Fig. 2.4. In
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case load transfer capability is suﬃcient to supply loads LA-LC , CB and s1
will open to isolate the faulted branch, and NO will close to transfer load.
All load points are backfed until the faulted branch has been repaired and
the normal system conﬁguration is restored. However, if this load transfer
will violate constraints in (2.2), alternative switch operations should be
sought. In the further analysis load is always cut at the receiving end of the
overloaded radial. Thus, we look for the closest switch downstream s1, which
is s2, and re-evaluate the constraints assuming s2 open. If the constraints
are not violated this time, load points LB and LC are backfed, whereas LA
stays disconnected until branch 1 has been repaired. Compared to the case
with no load transfer restrictions, branch 1 will be moved from set S2 to S1
for load point LA. Thus, LA will experience an increase in average annual
outage time. The basic reliability parameters for the remaining load points
will not change.
In this work, constraints were considered absolute, i.e. they cannot be
violated. In practise, network constraints are not always treated as absolute
requirements. For example, in case the voltage magnitude of LA in Fig. 2.4
is marginally less than Vmin, it is diﬃcult to predict whether the DSO would
strictly adhere to the constraint by not backfeeding LA.
Customers must be prioritised if constraints are violated when transferring
load. In principle, there are many possible strategies for prioritising load
[2,9], and some of them are listed below.
 cut load to customers with interruptible contracts;
 supply the maximum possible load without violating constraints;
 reduce load proportionally at all load points that can aﬀect the over-
load;
 cut load at the receiving end of the overloaded radial.
Partial supply to aggregated load points was not considered in this work;
thus, load points were either supplied or not supplied at all.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of switch operations and branch power ﬂows subject
to the failure of branch 1 and a subsequent system reconﬁguration.
2.5 Analytical Simulation
In this section the reliability assessment procedure applied in Publication
A is presented. The procedure is valid for any combination of AOSs and
MOSs, given that the placement of switches adheres to the previously stated
assumptions.
Rather than deﬁning the cut sets S1 and S2 for each load point, it is possible
to assess the impact of failures and accumulate load point indices sequen-
tially. This technique, often referred to as analytical simulation, is intuitive
and capable of capturing detailed physical and operational characteristics
of the EPDS [3,10]. The basic steps of the analytical simulation technique
are outlined below.
1. Select a component b with failure rate λb
2. Simulate the system’s response to the failure of b and compute the
impact on all load points
3. Weight the impacts by λb
4. Repeat the steps until the failure of all components have been simu-
lated
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2.5.1 A Two-Stage Restoration Procedure
In the applied EPDS network model, both lines and transformers were mod-
elled as branches. A two-stage restoration procedure was implemented, as
described in [11] and outlined below. Interrupted load points are classiﬁed
in sets SA, SB and SC , depending on the interruption duration. First, a
limited set of load points are restored by using the available AOSs. These
load points experience an interruption of duration equal to the automatic
sectionalising time and belong to SA. Second, additional load points are
restored by using the available MOSs. These load points experience an in-
terruption of duration equal to the manual sectionalising time and belong
to SB. Load points which are not restored before the faulted component
has been repaired belong to SC .
Fig. 2.5 shows a ﬂow chart of the restoration procedure, focusing on the
automatic restoration. A faulted branch b with nodes (ii, jj) is selected.
First, an upstream search is performed from node ii. In case a fuse is found
upstream b, it operates and all load points downstream the fuse belong to
SC , while the remaining load points are not interrupted. In case there are no
fuses upstream b, the circuit breaker will de-energise the faulted line and all
load points on the radial are interrupted. The upstream search will also look
for the AOS closest to ii and restore upstream load points by opening this.
In case there is a load transfer possibility through a normally open point
controlled by an AOS (AOSLT ) downstream jj, the downstream restora-
tion part of the algorithm starts. A downstream search from node jj of the
faulted branch is initiated, looking for the closest AOS (AOSDS). If any
AOSDS is identiﬁed, a power ﬂow analysis is performed, assuming AOSLT
closed and AOSDS open. If the network constraints are met, AOSLT is
closed and AOSDS is opened, otherwise a new downstream search is initi-
ated to ﬁnd the next AOSDS.
Once the automatic response has ﬁnished, it is possible to identify the load
points belonging to SA. Load points on the faulted radial which have not
had their supply restored yet, will either belong to SB or SC , depending on
the manual restoration.
It should be noted that the algorithm illustrated in Fig. 2.5 only considers
single load transfer options. A procedure including multiple transfer options
would be more elaborate, requiring a method for prioritising the transfer
option with the highest available capacity.
18 Electric Power Distribution Systems
Upstream search from ii
Close ﬁrst fuse or AOS found
Fuse closed ?
SC
Load transfer
controlled by AOS (AOSLT ) ?
Downstream search from jj
stop at ﬁrst AOS encountered (AOSDS)
Perform power ﬂow analysis
assuming AOSLT closed and AOSDS open
∀i ∈ NL : Vi ≥ Vmin?
∀b ∈ B : Ib ≤ Ib,max?
Update jj
Close AOSLT , open AOSDS
Check connectivity of load points SA
Manual restoration SB , SC
b = B ?
b = b+ 1
Initialise
Terminate
y
y
y
y
n
n
n
n
Figure 2.5: Flowchart of the automatic restoration stage.
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2.6 Energy End-uses and Customer Interruption
Costs
So far, a conventional approach for ﬁnding the basic reliability parameters
in an EPDS has been presented. In this section it is shown how the expected
customer interruption costs can be found based on results from the analyt-
ical simulation approach. It is elaborated how changes in energy end-uses
will impact expected customer interruption costs. This chapter summarises
the novel part of the method presented in Publication A.
2.6.1 Energy End-uses
Energy end-uses are often categorised, separating between space heating,
hot-tap water, cooling, lighting, fans and pumps, computers, etc. Alterna-
tive energy carriers, such as district heating and natural gas, are able to
cover some of the same energy end-uses as electricity. Other end-uses can
only be covered by electricity. In the further discussion end-uses are aggre-
gated in two major categories:
End-use category: Covered by:
Electricity specific electricity
Flexible any energy carrier
Consider an area where all energy end-uses are covered by electricity. By
introducing a second energy carrier, such as natural gas or district heating,
some of the ﬂexible end-uses initially served by the EPDS will be gradually
decoupled and served by the new energy carrier.
Will this shift in magnitude and type of demand aﬀect the optimal level of
investments in EPDS reliability-enhancing projects? Intuitively, a relief in
demand for electric power will lead to decreased interruption consequences
since less power has to be transported to the customers. Thus, the optimal
level of investment in reliability will decrease, compared to the case where
electricity serves all end-uses. Furthermore, a relief in load demand on a
tightly constrained EPDS radial may improve the reconﬁguration capabil-
ity, resulting in reliability improvements without additional investments.
On the other hand, customer surveys reveal that the electricity speciﬁc
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end-uses tend to have a higher associated cost of interruption. These con-
ﬂicting momentums are all considered when ﬁnding the expected customer
interruption costs in the presented optimisation method.
2.6.2 Customer Interruption Costs
Diﬀerent customer sectors apply electricity for diﬀerent end-uses. Surveys
from various countries show that each customer sector will evaluate the loss
of supply diﬀerently, depending on the interruption duration and the type
of end-uses the customer sector typically cover by electricity [12].
One way to monetise reliability of supply is to introduce a speciﬁc, sector-
dependent interruption cost that is independent of interruption duration.
Such costs are applied in several countries, including Norway [5, 12]. The
expected customer interruption cost (ECOST) can then be found as:
ECOST =
∑
b∈B
λb
∑
i∈NL
Piζirib (2.3)
where:
λb = failure rate of component b, in year
−1
Pi = average power consumption at load point i, in kW
ζi = interruption cost for the customer sector at load point i, in e/kWh
rib = interruption duration at load point i due to failure of component b,
in hours
The two loops in (2.3) represent the analytical simulation approach de-
scribed in section 2.5, where rib is determined based on the classiﬁcation of
each load point (in sets SA − SC).
For more detailed system planning, it is believed that the non-linear proﬁle
of interruption costs as a function of interruption duration should be ac-
counted for. Such proﬁles are conveniently displayed in a sector customer
damage function (SCDF). SCDFs are created by aggregating the cost func-
tions of individual customers in the same customer sector. By incorporating
such functions, equation (2.3) may be reformulated to (2.4).
ECOST =
∑
b∈B
λb
∑
i∈NL
Piζi(rib) (2.4)
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where:
ζi(rib) = interruption cost for the customer sector at load point i
due to failure of component b, in e/kW
The SCDFs provide important information about the costs customers asso-
ciate with the inability to perform their activities. It was shown in Publi-
cation A that the type of activities, or end-uses, performed by a customer
will inﬂuence the customer damage function.
Consider a load point i where all energy end-uses are covered by electricity
and where the SCDF ζi(r) reﬂects the interruption costs. Suppose that a
second energy carrier is introduced and takes over supply of the ﬂexible end-
uses at this load point. Results from a survey among Norwegian customers
indicate that the interruption costs associated with electricity speciﬁc end-
uses are diﬀerent from the interruption costs associated with ﬂexible end-
uses [13]. Therefore, it is likely to believe that the true SCDF for this load
point can be represented by a function ζnewi (r) which is diﬀerent from ζi(r).
Applying ζnewi (r) in (2.4) will aﬀect the ECOST. Publication A holds a
more detailed presentation of SCDFs and data from the Norwegian survey
in [13].
2.6.3 Load Duration Curves
In EPDSs with constrained capacity, power ﬂow studies will reveal whether
the network constraints are met before system reconﬁgurations are per-
formed. Estimates of reconﬁguration capability are normally based on sys-
tem peak load, and thus, contributes to a conservative estimate of network
reliability [2]. For more detailed reliability studies, load duration curves
(LDCs) may be applied. An LDC comprises load data plotted in a de-
scending order of magnitude, where each load level has a corresponding
probability of occurrence. Incorporating such load variations in (2.4), leads
to (2.5).
ECOST =
∑
k∈K
prk
∑
b∈B
λb
∑
i∈NL
Pi,kζi(rib) (2.5)
where:
K = number of steps on the LDC
prk = probability of load step k
Pi,k = power consumption at load point i for load step k, in kW
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Decoupling the ﬂexible end-uses from the EPDS will not only reduce the
demand for electricity, but also alter the proﬁle of the LDC [14]. Generally,
the LDC related to ﬂexible end-uses has a lower utilisation time2 than is
the case for electricity speciﬁc end-uses. In order to provide an accurate
measure of reconﬁguration capability, diﬀerent LDCs were applied for load
points covering all end-uses and those covering electricity speciﬁc end-uses
only.
2.7 Optimal Allocation of Switchgear
In this section it is brieﬂy discussed how expected customer interruption
costs can be included in an optimisation procedure for ﬁnding the optimal
allocation of switches in a radially operated EPDS. By performing this type
of study, a network company can analyse whether the amount, location
and type of switches is appropriate according to the end-uses served by the
system. The major ﬁndings from the case studies in Publication A and [15]
are restated at the end of this section.
Finding the optimal allocation of switchgear in radially operated EPDS is a
complex problem which has been addressed by several authors [16–22]. The
problem may be classiﬁed as a combinatorial optimisation problem having
a non-linear and non-diﬀerentiable objective function. Various techniques
have been applied to solve the optimisation problem, e.g. dynamic pro-
gramming [16], binary programming [17], simulated annealing [18], direct
search [19] and genetic algorithms [20–22].
The applied optimisation procedure is based on a genetic algorithm (GA).
The objective function is formulated in 2.6, where ECOST for an EPDS
serving a predeﬁned set of end-uses and having a given combination of
switches is found from (2.5). ICOST is the total annualised capital cost for
the selected set of switches.
Minimise: ECOST+ ICOST (2.6)
2utilisation time is defined as the ratio between annual energy and maximum power
demands.
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2.7.1 Application to Test Systems
The suggested method was tested on the EPDSs connected to buses 5 and 6
of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) described in [23,24]. Two diﬀerent
supply scenarios were assumed:
1. All energy end-uses are supplied by electricity at all load points.
2. All energy end-uses are supplied by electricity at some selected load
points, and only the electricity speciﬁc end-uses at others.
The optimal allocation of switches was found for both scenarios. Scenario 2
was ﬁrst tested using the same SCDFs and LDCs as for scenario 1. Then the
SCDFs and LDCs were adjusted as described in Section 2.6, and scenario 2
was retested.
The results generally indicated that the amount of switches allocated in
the test systems decreases when decoupling the ﬂexible end-uses. However,
by using customer interruption costs and load duration curves adjusted
according to the electricity speciﬁc end-use, the reduction is not as evident as
found when using aggregated data. Furthermore, it was found that changes
in SCDFs have a more signiﬁcant impact on the results than changes in
LDCs.
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Chapter 3
Natural Gas Distribution
Systems
Publication B
This chapter summarises and supplements the content of Publication B,
where a reliability evaluation approach well known from the electric power
domain was applied to natural gas distribution systems.
First, the structural similarities between natural gas and electric power sys-
tems are discussed. Subsequently, the most important components in natu-
ral gas distribution systems and their possible failure modes are addressed.
The impact of valve allocation and system operation on reliability of supply
is elaborated. Finally, a test-system study is presented, supplementing the
case study in Publication B.
3.1 Reliability Modelling and Hierarchical Levels
Fig. 3.1 illustrates an onshore natural gas system (NGS). In such systems,
gas is transported from the source (S) to the consumers through a network
of pipelines operated at diﬀerent pressure levels. The transmission system
is characterised by few pipelines covering large distances at high operating
pressures. Compressor stations (C) are used to maintain the desired pres-
sure in the transmission network. As an interface between the transmission
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and the distribution system, a measuring and regulating station (MRS) me-
ters the gas and reduces its pressure so that it is suitable for distribution
purposes. It should be noted that the system presented in Fig. 3.1 is rather
simple, as it depends on one source and one transmission pipeline only.
RS
RS
MRSC
S
Transmission DistributionDistribution
High-Pressure Medium-Pressure
Figure 3.1: Illustration of a natural gas system (• = load point).
There are some obvious analogies between EPSs and NGSs. For example
the fact that voltages and pressures are step-wise reduced on the pathway
from the transmission system to the customers. For both systems, genera-
tors and sources are mainly located at high voltage and pressure level and
load is connected at low voltage and pressure. Realising these structural
similarities, [25] suggested organising reliability models applied to NGSs in
functional zones and hierarchical levels similar to the ones applied in the
EPS domain. The following three functional zones were suggested:
1. Gas production, gathering and processing facilities
2. Gas transmission facilities
3. Gas distribution facilities
The presented work and the further discussion in this chapter is concerned
with reliability methods applicable in functional zone 3. The system bound-
ary is deﬁned such that MRSs are not encompassed, assuming fully reliable
supply from these stations. The natural gas distribution system (NGDS)
will normally comprise two or three subsystems, operating at diﬀerent pres-
sure levels. A regulator station (RS) provides the interface between sub-
systems. In Fig. 3.1 two subsystems are shown; the high-pressure and the
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medium-pressure distribution system. A reliability analysis can be per-
formed considering both subsystems combined as well as either one individ-
ually, as discussed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Previous Studies
Reliability evaluation of natural gas production and transmission facili-
ties has been investigated in several publications, such as [25–29]. Au-
thors [27–29] performed Monte Carlo simulations to assess the availability
of suﬃcient compression facilities in the transmission system to meet the
consumer load. A method for minimising loss of supply due to transmission
pipeline failures was presented in [26]. These publications all concern the
natural gas transmission system, considering the downstream distribution
systems as aggregated load points. On the contrary, this chapter focus on
the NGDS and treats upstream supply from the transmission system as fully
reliable.
3.3 Unwanted Events
There are basically two unwanted events in NGSs; gas escape and customer
interruptions. Uncontrolled release of natural gas or loss of pressure in the
system can cause unsafe situations due to the potential explosive mixture
of gas and air. This may be contrasted with electricity, where, in the event
of loss of supply, the system itself is considered safe. Thus, when gas leaks
from the system, and the leak is considered severe, the component causing
the leak will be isolated, which in turn may cause customer interruptions.
The system operator will always prioritise to minimise gas escape in critical
situations. Therefore, in some cases this objective is followed at the cost of
less reliable supply to the end-users.
Available failure statistics are primarily concerned with causes to gas escape,
and do not address customer interruptions. It is indicated that pipeline
incidents contribute most frequently to gas escape at both transmission [30]
and distribution level [31].
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3.4 Component Failures
The components in an NGDS may be grouped as regulator stations, pipelines
and valves. In the further study it is assumed that all valves are fully re-
liable. A brief discussion on regulator station and pipeline failures is pre-
sented below.
3.4.1 Regulator Station
A regulator station will normally have two parallel and redundant process-
ing lines, each comprising a rather complex setup of valves and pressure
regulating devices. A typical setup is presented in Publication B. In the
following, a regulator station failure describes the state when the station
is not capable of supplying gas to the underlying distribution system. The
corresponding failure rate was simply set to λRS . For detailed reliability
studies of regulator stations, the reader should refer to other sources, such
as [32].
In case the reliability study encompasses both the high and medium-pressure
NGDSs, the regulator station will be within the system boundary. Alterna-
tively, studies can be focused on either of the subsystems alone, using the
regulator station as an aggregated load point or upstream source, respec-
tively. Thus, in terms of reliability modelling, the regulator station can be
treated analogous to substations in the EPDS.
3.4.2 Pipeline
A pipeline incident may be deﬁned as any event leading to gas escape from
the pipeline. It is separated between a pipeline incident and a pipeline
failure, as the DSO’s response to pipeline incidents will vary depending on
the severity of the incident. Pipeline incidents are classiﬁed as follows:
 Minor leakage
 Leakage
 Rupture
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In case of a minor leakage, the pipeline can be repaired while carrying load.
Thus, the pipeline is not taken out of service, and supply to customers is
not interrupted. For leakages, described by a pipeline leakage failure-rate
λPL, the pipeline itself is isolated for repair. However, it is assumed that
the leakage does not aﬀect gas ﬂow before the pipeline has been isolated.
In case of a rupture, described by a pipeline rupture failure-rate λPR, all
supply pathways to the faulted pipeline are shut oﬀ as fast as possible.
For the further analysis, only leakages and ruptures are considered pipeline
failures. It should be stressed that the classiﬁcation of pipeline incidents in
this work is done to separate between the diﬀerent operator responses to
these incidents.
3.5 Valve Allocation
Proper allocation of valves is essential for secure and reliable operation of
the NGDS. Valves are installed along the NGDS to allow fault isolation and
network reconﬁguration. Valves are automatically, remotely or manually
operated, depending on pressure level and operating philosophy. In this
work it was diﬀerentiated between the remotely operated valve (ROV) and
the manually operated valve (MOV). Valve allocation follows the practise
adopted in Norway [33]; valves in the high-pressure NGDS and at the send-
ing end of pipelines leaving the regulator stations are ROVs. The remaining
valves are MOVs. The medium-pressure NGDS shown in Fig. 3.2 exempli-
ﬁes this layout. The system comprises pipelines 1-9, valves v1-v5 and load
points LA- LD. Valves v1 and v2 are ROVs, whereas v3-v5 are MOVs.
RS
LA LB
LC LD
1 2 3 4
5
6
7
8
9
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
Figure 3.2: Valve allocation in a medium-pressure natural gas distribution
system.
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3.6 Operator Response to Failures
In case a pipeline fails, the fault is isolated by use of either valves or clamps.
Clamps are used to squeeze oﬀ the faulted pipeline segment, and it is as-
sumed just as fast to use as MOVs for fault isolation. In either case, the
repair crew has to be physically present at the fault location. In case of a
leakage, it is assumed that only the faulted pipeline is isolated. In case of a
rupture, the closest ROV or set of ROVs are used to isolate the fault from
the source(s).
The medium-pressure NGDS shown in Fig. 3.2 has a meshed structural
topology. The reliability of supply to consumers may depend on whether
the system is operated with an open or closed loop. By closing the valve v5
under normal operation, the system is radially operated.
In case any of the pipelines on the upper radial in Fig. 3.2 (pipelines 1-
4) ruptures, v1 is closed to limit gas escape. Load points LA and LB are
interrupted, but load points LC and LD are not interrupted since the ﬂow
in the lower radial is not aﬀected by the failure response. If the system was
operated as a loop by keeping v5 normally open, the DSO would have to
close both v1 and v2 to limit gas escape, and thus all load points would be
interrupted.
In the case of leakages, the operational topology will not aﬀect reliability of
supply. Consider a leakage in pipeline 1. There are no signiﬁcant changes
in gas ﬂow. Technically, the pipeline could be operated while repairing the
leakage, but should be isolated for safety reasons. In case v5 is normally
closed, it is assumed that this valve has been opened before pipeline 1 is iso-
lated. Thus, load point interruptions only occur in case the reconﬁguration
capability is insuﬃcient to backfeed load points LA and LB .
The advantage of meshed operation is a better pressure distribution through-
out the system and, consequently, the possibility to reduce energy needed
for compression upstream the NGDS. On the other hand, larger parts of the
NGDS may have to be isolated in case of pipeline ruptures. The argumenta-
tion has obvious analogies to the EPDS. Energy losses and voltage drops are
reduced when operating the system as a loop, but radial operation is often
said to be safer and provide a more reliable system operation. So should
valve v5 be normally open or closed? It seems like industrial practises vary,
and there is no obvious answer to this question [33,34].
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Unlike the EPDS, which is extensively equipped with fuses for rapid isolation
of failures, there are usually no valves which automatically isolate faulted
network segments in the medium-pressure NGDS [35]. Thus, in case v5 is
normally closed, the rupture of any pipeline on a given radial will interrupt
the load points connected to that particular radial.
3.7 Reliability Modelling
As discussed in the previous sections, there are structural and operational
similarities between EPDSs and NGDSs, and both systems are constructed
to provide reliable supply to the customers. However, to the author’s knowl-
edge, no comprehensive reliability model has been previously presented and
applied to NGDS.
Publication B presents an approach for assessing reliability of supply in
NGDSs, following the steps of the analytical simulation approach described
in Section 2.5. The model was inspired by similar models applied to EPDSs
and water distribution systems [10,36].
Steady-state simulations of ﬂows and pressures were incorporated in the
approach to evaluate network constraints. It was generally assumed that gas
storage does not aﬀect reliability of supply at distribution system level. The
impact of storage in transmission systems is addressed in Chapter 5. A load
point interruption was deﬁned as an event where the load point pressure is
lower than a predeﬁned minimum pressure pmin. Pipeline constraints, such
as maximum ﬂow velocity, were not considered. A detailed description on
how to compute pipeline ﬂows and nodal pressures in complex gas networks
comprising valves and regulators is provided in Appendix A.
The reliability model was tested on two test systems.
3.7.1 Test System I
A simple, ﬁctitious NGDS test system was presented in Publication B, sim-
ilar to the one shown in Fig. 3.2. Load point reliability indices were found
both for radial and meshed system operation. The case study in Publication
B considered regulator station failures and pipeline ruptures. Violations of
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network constraints were treated by cutting load at the receiving end of the
overloaded radial.
Incorporating pipeline leakages in the model is straightforward. For each
selected pipeline, both the response to a leakage and to a rupture must be
simulated and weighted by failure rates λPL and λPR, respectively.
3.7.2 Test System II
Analysis of a second test system is presented below to supplement the
case study in Publication B. The test system is shown in Fig. 3.3, being
a medium-pressure NGDS operated with open loops. Pipeline lengths and
diameters as well as load data and nodal numbers are taken from [37]. Each
node represents either a junction or a load point. The system is fed through
one single regulator station, and the operating pressure is set to 4.0 bar. It
is assumed that valves in the test system are MOVs, except from the ROV
v shown in Fig. 3.3.
In case a pipeline in the system ruptures, v is closed and all load points
are interrupted. Similarly, if the regulator station fails, all load points are
interrupted. For simplicity, these failures are omitted in the further study,
and only pipeline failures in terms of leakages are considered. A pipeline
leakage failure-rate of λPL = 0.1 (km × year)−1 is assumed. Furthermore,
it is assumed that each faulted pipeline may be manually isolated and that
the repair time is identical for all pipelines. Only ﬁrst-order failures are
considered and upstream supply is considered fully reliable.
When simulating the system’s response to a selected failure (step 2 in the
analytical simulation procedure outlined in Section 2.5), the following steps
are undertaken:
a) Isolate the faulted pipeline (by use of MOVs or clamps)
b) Evaluate pressures at all load points
c) Register interruptions for load points not meeting the pressure re-
quirement pmin
Note that the procedure does not include any operator action to curtail
load in case the pressure requirement is violated. Consequently, the calcu-
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lated indices are pessimistic. The load curtailment algorithm presented in
Chapter 4 could be applied to this problem.
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Figure 3.3: An NGDS test system.
Table 3.1 presents the average interruption rates found for ﬁve selected load
points in Fig. 3.3. Three diﬀerent minimum pressure levels were used: 2.0,
1.5 and 1.0 bar. The ﬁfth column holds the pressure values (pinit) for the
system in its normal state. As expected, the load points experiencing the
lowest pinit are the ones beneﬁting the most, in terms of reduced average
interruption rate, when decreasing pmin.
Table 3.1: Average interruption rates for some selected load points.
Average interruption rate [year−1] pinit [bar]
Load pt pmin =2.0 bar pmin =1.5 bar pmin =1.0 bar –
1 0.293 0.255 0.244 2.15
3 0.244 0.244 0.244 2.44
7 0.279 0.250 0.244 2.20
24 0.264 0.264 0.256 2.55
28 0.363 0.320 0.309 2.13
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Chapter 4
District Heating Systems
Publication C
This chapter serves as an introduction to Publication C, introducing the ba-
sic network structure and operational principles of a district heating system.
A simplified thermal power-flow model is presented together with its under-
lying assumptions. The model is suitable for evaluating the district heating
system’s steady-state response to failures, and is applied to a test system
presented at the end of the chapter.
District heating systems depend on electricity from the electric power sys-
tem for proper operation. Publication C presents a method for assessing
this dependency, building on the thermal power-flow model described in this
chapter.
4.1 Reliability Modelling and Hierarchical Levels
In contrast to the EPS and the NGS, the district heating system (DHS)
is considerably less geographical widespread. Transporting hot water over
long distances is not a viable option when considering technical and eco-
nomical constraints. For this reason, DHSs are normally located within the
boundaries of a city or a local municipality.
The following system description is based on a DHS comprising two separate
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distribution circuits, referred to as the primary and the secondary distribu-
tion system. A primary distribution system is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The
system comprises thermal power production units TP1 and TP2, pumps
PU1-PU4 and heat exchanger stations HE1-HE4. A network of pipelines
connects production units and heat exchangers. In each heat exchanger,
the water in the primary distribution system is heat exchanged with water
in a secondary distribution circuit to supply customers at a lower pressure
and temperature. Large customers are occasionally connected directly to
the primary distribution system.
Analogous to the diﬀerent voltage and pressure levels in the EPS and NGS,
larger DHSs are normally split into subsystems operating at diﬀerent pres-
sure and temperature levels. Pressures and temperatures are reduced step-
wise as thermal power is transported from the production units to the cus-
tomers. However, unlike ﬂow in an NGS, the ﬂow medium in a DHS is
physically separated between subsystems.
As for the EPS and NGS, it is possible to split the DHS in three functional
zones, grouping thermal power production, transmission and distribution
facilities. The primary distribution system may be considered a transmis-
sion system, treating the heat exchangers as aggregated load points. As
this work concerns the primary distribution system, it may be seen as an
HLII-study; the combined analysis of the functional zones of thermal power
production and primary distribution system facilities.
HE1
HE2
HE3
HE4
PU1
PU2
PU3
PU4
TP1 TP2
Figure 4.1: Illustration of a district heating system.
4.2 Previous Studies
Few authors have presented studies on reliability of supply in DHSs. The
topic is generally addressed in [38,39]. Two methods previously applied to
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DHSs are discussed in [39]; fault tree analysis and the loss of load method.
Fault tree analysis was aimed at components and subsystems within the
DHS, ﬁnding the respective failure probabilities. The loss of load method
is an HLI-study, ﬁnding the loss of load probability given production unit
failure-rates and load distributions in the DHS. This method assumes a
perfect network connecting production units and loads.
A series of publications propose diﬀerent models for assessing the reliability
and availability of the DHS in Turin, Italy [40–44]. A cut-set approach
was presented in [40], incorporating failures of thermal power production
units, pipelines, valves and heat exchangers in meshed DHSs. However, the
presented reliability model did not take into account the physical ﬂows in
the DHS. A later publication presented a Monte Carlo approach applied to
the same network [44]. The hydraulic and thermal responses from the DHS
were included in the Monte Carlo simulations, analysing water ﬂow and
thermal power ﬂow separately. To the author’s knowledge, this approach
did not incorporate the possibility to curtail and prioritise load, and was
primarily aimed at radially operated networks.
4.3 Component Failures
The work presented in Publication C is not a reliability analysis of the
coupled EPDS and DHS, but rather a study of the two systems’ vulnerability
to failures in the EPDS. The dependency of the DHS on electric power1 was
modelled as illustrated in Fig. 4.2. The EPDS network model is represented
by a branch bEPDS having a load point node i. This node stores a pointer to
possible connected DHS nodes, in this case node j. In case i is interrupted,
j is set to a faulted mode, and DHS consequences are quantiﬁed.
bEPDS bDHSi j
Figure 4.2: Modelling the district heating system’s dependency on electric
power.
1The term electric power is used when referring to electric power from the EPS in this
chapter.
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This chapter only concerns the district heating part of the material pre-
sented in Publication C. Thus, we are mainly concerned with what happens
when node j is faulted rather than the EPDS failures causing j to reach its
faulted mode. In the following, only DHS node failures are treated and loss
of electric power is considered the only failure cause.
Two component types are considered dependent on electricity:
 Pumps
 Thermal power production units
Pumps are usually driven by electricity and therefore depend on electricity.
It is not as easy to generalise the dependency of thermal power production
units on electricity. Some of these units, such as electric boilers and heat
pumps, have obvious dependencies, while others need electricity to perform
auxiliary functions. It was assumed that pumps and thermal power genera-
tion units fail to operate if they do not receive electric power from the EPS.
Both pumps and production units may have a dedicated back-up system
for electric power supply, or the DSO may have mobile back-up units. The
possibility of applying such back-up solutions was not modelled, but could
be added as a cold stand-by switching system.
Consider the DHS in Fig. 4.1. As the system has several production units
and pumps, it is not immediately clear if a single component failure will
result in insuﬃcient supply to any of the heat exchangers. Thus, the sys-
tem’s response to such failures should be simulated to evaluate the resulting
consequences. For this reason, a thermal power-ﬂow model was formulated,
as described in the following sections.
4.4 Describing Thermal Power Flow
Studying the changes in thermal power ﬂow due to component failures in
a DHS involves both pressure and temperature dynamics. Procedures for
simulating thermal power ﬂow in DHSs normally take advantage of the fact
that changes in pressure are distributed signiﬁcantly faster throughout the
system than temperature changes. By assuming a quasi-dynamic condition
between mass ﬂow and temperature, the mass ﬂow can be found indepen-
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dently from the temperature distribution and the temperatures are updated
later on by assuming constant mass ﬂow [45–47].
For the purpose of evaluating the consequences of nodal failures in a DHS, a
simpliﬁed power-ﬂow model was developed. This model fully decouples the
pressure and temperature responses, considering the steady-state solution
only. As a ﬁrst step to describe this model and its assumptions, consider
the ﬂow in the simple DHS in Fig. 4.3.
4.4.1 Changes in Pressure and Temperature
Fig. 4.3 illustrates a simple DHS with primary and secondary distribution
systems. The primary distribution system to the left of the heat exchanger
HE has a thermal power production unit TP and a pump PUP . To the
right of the heat exchanger, water is circulated in a secondary distribution
system by means of a pump PUS, serving a single load.
The thermal power ﬂow, in terms of changes in temperatures and pressures
through the primary distribution system, is described below. This descrip-
tion relies on two assumptions:
1. Isothermal ﬂow through pipelines and pumps (constant temperature)
2. Isobar ﬂow through production units (constant pressure)
Starting at point a in Fig. 4.3, water is circulated in the indicated direc-
tion at a pressure pa and temperature Ta. Flowing through the production
unit and reaching point b, the temperature increases whereas the pressure
is assumed constant. Subsequently, pressure increases and temperature is
assumed constant as water is drawn through the pump between points b and
c. Flowing through the pipeline between points c and d, pressure decreases
while temperature does not change. Thermal power is supplied to the sec-
ondary distribution system in the heat exchanger, and both temperature
and pressure decrease between points d and e. Summing up, the pressure
gain added by the pump PUP is lost in the pipeline ﬂow (supply-return) and
through the heat exchanger. The temperature gain added by the production
unit TP is lost in the heat exchanger.
The thermal power P t exchanged from the primary to the secondary distri-
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Figure 4.3: Temperature and pressure variations in a simple district heating
system.
bution system through the heat exchanger is expressed as:
P t = Cp ×Q×∆T (4.1)
where all variables refer to the primary distribution system side of the heat
exchanger and:
Cp = Heat capacity of water
Q = Mass ﬂow through heat exchanger
∆T = Diﬀerence between heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperature
4.4.2 Steady-State Response to Failures
Three components in Fig. 4.3 fail to operate when loosing electric power
supply; PUP , TP and PUS . It is brieﬂy outlined how the system responds
to such failures. For simplicity we assume that the components are bypassed
when faulted.
If PUP fails, the component is bypassed so that pb = pc. The mass ﬂow Q
quickly reaches zero, as do thermal power supply to the heat exchanger.
If TP fails in Fig. 4.3, the component is bypassed so that Ta = Tb. Changes
in temperature are closely related to the ﬂow of the circulating water. As-
suming that Q is kept constant by PUP , the time it takes before supply falls
short of demand at the heat exchanger depends on the circulation speed and
the distance between b and d. The dynamic changes in temperature sub-
ject to the failure of TP is discussed in Section 5.7 and Publication D. The
steady-state solution in this case is obvious; ∆T eventually reaches zero,
and there is no thermal power supply to the heat exchanger.
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Being physically separated from the mass ﬂow in the primary distribution
system, the mass ﬂow in the secondary distribution system depends on the
pumping power of PUS . Thus, if PUS fails, the load in Fig. 4.3 will loose
supply. In the further study, this is referred to as a failure of the aggregated
load point, and HE is bypassed to reduce load in the primary distribution
system.
4.5 A Network Flow Model
A general formulation of thermal power ﬂowing in a DHS may be obtained
by applying a conventional network ﬂow model, explicitly considering ther-
mal power ﬂow rather than temperatures and pressures. In this type of
model, the thermal power ﬂow is described by conservation laws only. Net-
work ﬂow models have been applied in investigations related to optimisation
of multi-carrier energy systems in [48,49].
The model should be able to handle situations where production capacity
does not meet demand, i.e. where supply to loads must be curtailed to fulﬁl
the conservation law. In this study, emphasis was put on minimising the
global consequences of DHS failures. Component failure and repair rates
are not treated here, and the consequences are simply described in terms of
curtailed thermal power P tcurt in the system. Other relevant system indices,
e.g. indices related to the number and type of consumers having their supply
interrupted could easily be incorporated in the presented model.
The following linear programming formulation will ﬁnd the minimum cur-
tailed thermal power:
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Min.:
P tcurt =
∑
i∈NL
(1− xi)Di (4.2a)
S.T.: ∑
j:b(j,i)∈B
P tb(j,i) −
∑
j:b(i,j)∈B
P tb(i,j) +Gi − xiDi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (4.2b)
|P tb | ≤ P tb,max ∀(i, j) ∈ B (4.2c)
Gi ≤ Gi,max ∀i ∈ NG (4.2d)
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ NL (4.2e)
Where xi is the ratio between supplied thermal power and total demand at
load-point node i. Restriction (4.2b) describes the thermal power balance
at each node. P t
b(i,j) denotes thermal power ﬂow in the pipeline connecting
nodes i and j, being constrained by (4.2c). Gi and Di denote thermal power
production and demand at node i, respectively, where Gi is constrained by
its maximum power Gi,max in (4.2d). The network ﬂow model relies on a
set of underlying assumptions:
Sufficient nodal pressures: The formulation does not consider the phys-
ical law linking mass ﬂow and pressure. Thus, the model relies on the
assumption that there is suﬃcient pressure at all load nodes.
Lossless flow: Pipeline ﬂow is isothermal. Thus, temperature is reduced
only when the water ﬂows through heat exchangers at the aggregated
load points. In practise, heat losses will depend on several physical
parameters, such as mass ﬂow and outdoor air temperature.
Steady-state: The network ﬂow problem describes the system at steady-
state. Transient changes in thermal power ﬂow due to failures and
redispatch of production units and pumps are not considered.
Although applicable for general investigations of system behaviour, the net-
work ﬂow model was not considered appropriate for analysing the conse-
quences of nodal failures, due to its inability to deal with deactivation and
failure of pumps. For this reason, it was decided to make some assumptions
regarding thermal power-ﬂow control in DHSs, in order to arrive at a more
accurate model.
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4.6 Controlling Thermal Power Flow
It is possible to control the thermal power ﬂow in a DHS by predeﬁning the
mass ﬂow L through each heat exchanger and production unit, as illustrated
in Fig. 4.4. L has a positive reference out of the supply network. G is
the injected thermal power and D is the consumed thermal power, so that
{G,D} ∝ |L|. This control principle is based on a constant temperature
diﬀerential ∆T at each load point and production unit. Initially, water is
ﬂowing through all heat exchangers and into the return pipeline network at a
constant rate. Conversely, water is injected into the supply pipeline network
through the production units at a constant rate. Thus, at steady-state, the
mass balance in (4.3) is always fulﬁlled.∑
i∈N
Li = 0 (4.3)
HE1
HE2
HE3
HE4
PU2
PU3
TP1 TP2
G1, L1 G8, L8
D2, L2
D3, L3
D5, L5
D7, L7
1
2
3
4 5
6 7
8
Figure 4.4: Illustration of a district heating system, indicating nodal de-
mand and production in terms of mass ﬂow L, and thermal powers D and
G.
Unlike most other hydraulic networks, the DHS consists of both supply and
return pipelines. In most cases, the pressure distribution in the supply net-
work does not aﬀect the return network because the ﬂow rates are controlled
by the customer’s control system. Therefore, simulations of mass ﬂow and
nodal pressures are normally carried out only for the supply network [50].
Each aggregated load point requires a certain minimum pressure diﬀeren-
tial ∆pmin over its heat exchanger. This requirement was translated to a
minimum pressure requirement pmin at each aggregated load point.
All thermal power production units have an associated pump responsible for
providing ﬂow through the unit and into the supply network. In case this
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pump fails, the ﬂow rate through the pump is set to zero. Similarly, in case
the production unit fails itself, the ﬂow rate through the associated pump
is set to zero. Accordingly, a production unit together with its associated
pump may be viewed as one aggregated unit, as indicated by the dotted-line
boxes in Fig. 4.4.
Some pumps are operated independently of production units, such as PU2
and PU3 in Fig. 4.4. These pumps will usually have the ability to circulate
ﬂow in both directions. In case an independently operating pump fails, it
is bypassed.
Having predeﬁned the nodal mass ﬂow injections and demands at N − 1
nodes, the steady-state mass ﬂows and pressures are found by using the
method described in Appendix A.
4.7 A Simplified Thermal Power-Flow Model
Based on the mass-ﬂow control principle described in the previous section, it
is now possible to deﬁne a model which is more accurate and physical than
the network ﬂow model presented in Section 4.5. The presented model is
suitable for evaluating the steady-state consequences of component failures
in DHSs.
Any set of failures F concerning pump failures or implying the deactivation
of pumps are evaluated as described in Algorithm 1. First, a ﬂow simula-
tion, as described in Appendix A, is performed in line 3 of Algorithm 1,
to ﬁnd the vectors of pipeline mass ﬂows Qb and load point pressures pi.
Subsequently, pipeline thermal power ﬂows Pt
b
are found in line 4. In case
system requirements are not met in line 5, we assume that the DSO will
actively curtail load according to a procedure MinCurt in line 6. The ob-
jective of this procedure is to meet system requirements while minimising
P tcurt as deﬁned in (4.2a).
Partial supply of loads was not considered. Thus, xi in (4.2a) was treated as
a boolean variable. A simple binary GA was used to solve the combinatorial
optimisation problem MinCurt. Each binary string in the GA indicates
whether a load point is served (xi = 1) or bypassed (xi = 0).
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Algorithm 1 Finding min. curtailed thermal power for a failure set F
Ensure: F contains faulted or deactivated pumps
1: adjust nodal demands and injections according to F
2: P tcurt ← 0
3: Qb,pi ← FlowSimualtion
4: Pt
b
← CpQb∆T {eqn. (4.1)}
5: if any
(
pi < pmin ‖ P tb > P tb,max ‖ Gi > Gmax,i
)
then
6: P tcurt ← MinCurt
7: end if
8: return P tcurt
4.7.1 Example: A Simple Test System
The DHS in Fig. 4.4 was used to test the proposed thermal power-ﬂow
model, minimising P tcurt subject to some selected failure sets F . Pipeline and
nodal data are listed in Tables 4.1- 4.2, along with thermal power ﬂows and
pressures for the system in its initial, healthy state. The Hazen-Williams
equation was applied as described in [51], using a roughness coeﬃcient of
130. A constant ∆T of 50  and an operating pressure of 16 bar was
applied. Pumps PU2 and PU3 were set to deliver a constant outlet pressure
of 1.0 per unit (p.u.), and the minimum pressure requirement was set to
pmin = 0.9 p.u.
Table 4.1: Pipeline parameters and initial thermal power ﬂows.
Nr Send. Rec. Length Diameter Capacity Initial Flow
node node [km] [m] [MW] [MW]
1 1 2 1.00 0.20 20 19.00
2 1 3 1.00 0.20 20 19.00
3 2 3 0.50 0.20 20 −0.95
4 2 4 2.00 0.20 20 4.95
5 3 6 2.00 0.20 20 5.05
6 4 5 2.00 0.20 20 4.95
7 5 7 0.50 0.20 20 0.92
8 5 8 1.00 0.15 7 −5.97
9 6 7 2.00 0.15 7 5.05
10 7 8 1.00 0.15 7 −6.03
The minimum consequences for some selected failure sets are presented in
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Table 4.2: Nodal demand, supply and initial pressure.
Node D Gmax pinit
[MW] [MW] [p.u.]
1 – 50 1.00
2 15 – 0.92
3 13 – 0.92
5 10 – 0.99
7 12 – 0.99
8 – 12 1.02
Table 4.3. Minimum curtailed thermal powers from the thermal power-
ﬂow model are compared with results from the network ﬂow model. For
this comparison it is assumed that the network ﬂow model is as presented
in equations (4.2), but the variable xi is treated as a binary variable, i.e.
partial load supply is not considered. It is indicated which constraints that
are violated in the thermal power-ﬂow model for each evaluated failure
set, before loads are curtailed. Consider the case where TP2 fails. The
associated pump is deactivated and ﬂow through the unit is set to zero.
Mass ﬂow through TP1 is increased accordingly to fulﬁl the nodal mass
balance, and the new nodal pressures are evaluated. The pressure constraint
(p2 = p3 = 0.86 p.u.) and some pipeline constraints (P1 = P2 = 25 MW) are
violated, as indicated in Table 4.3. The minimum consequences are caused
when curtailing load at node 5 for both models, i.e. P tcurt = 10 MW. If
both TP2 and PU2 fail, the pressure constraint is binding in the thermal
power-ﬂow model, giving P tcurt = 12 MW. Pressures are not considered in
the network ﬂow model; hence, the curtailed power does not change from
the case where only TP2 was faulted.
Table 4.3: Minimum curtailed thermal power for some selected failure sets.
Failure Constraint Thermal Network
set violation power flow flow
F pmin P tb,max Gmax P tcurt [MW] P tcurt [MW]
TP1
√ √ √
38 38
TP2
√ √
10 10
PU2 or PU3 0 0
PU2 and PU3
√
10 0
TP2, PU2
√ √
12 10
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4.7.2 Applicability of the Simplified Model
Controlling the thermal power ﬂow in a DHS is a complex problem. In this
chapter a simpliﬁed thermal power-ﬂow model was presented suitable for
analysing the steady-state post-contingency ﬂows. However, it should be
stressed that this model relies on numerous assumptions, as stated in the
text.
In principle, the simpliﬁed thermal power-ﬂow model may be applied in
reliability evaluation of DHSs considering both node and branch failures,
incorporating failure rates and repair times. However, care should be taken
as changes in temperature are slow in large DHSs. Thus, assuming steady-
state thermal power ﬂow can give misleading results.
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Chapter 5
Pipeline Storage
Publication D
This chapter presents a Markov-based method for incorporating pipeline
storage in reliability modelling of natural gas pipeline systems. First, it is
elaborated how to find the stored amount of energy in a natural gas pipeline.
Subsequently, a Markov model is presented, considering pipeline storage as a
subsystem with failure and repair rates. Finally, an approach for finding the
basic load-point reliability indices in radial natural gas transmission systems
is suggested.
The chapter serves as an introduction and supplement to Publication D.
Publication D also suggests applying the proposed Markov model to district
heating systems. This option is discussed at the end of this chapter.
5.1 Introduction
In contrast to electrical energy, energy transported in pipeline systems does
not necessarily require distinctive storage facilities, as the pipelines consti-
tuting the network can be used for this purpose. In Chapter 3 we ignored
this feature, claiming that energy storage in pipelines is negligible at dis-
tribution system level. However, as transportation distances and pipeline
dimensions increase, pipeline storage should not be neglected. The material
presented in this chapter is primarily relevant for studies concerning natural
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gas transmission systems.
Consider a simple natural gas transmission system as illustrated in Fig. 5.1,
transporting gas from a source h towards an aggregated load point j through
two branches bhi and bij . In this context the aggregated load point is typi-
cally the supply point to a downstream NGDS. Supply to the load point re-
lies on the availability of the two upstream branches and the source. Branch
bhi may e.g. be a compressor or a pipeline, whereas bij is a long pipeline.
If bhi fails, it is isolated by valves v1 and v2, and j is no longer connected
to the source. However, depending on the amount of energy stored in bij ,
j may be supplied yet for a while. At best, the stored energy is suﬃcient
to supply j until bhi has been repaired and connectivity between h and j is
restored. In case the stored energy is not enough to fully bridge the repair
of bhi, it may still delay and shorten interruption of supply to j and provide
useful time for corrective actions in the downstream network.
v1 v2
h i jbhi bij
Figure 5.1: A natural gas transmission system.
5.2 Previous Studies
Pipeline storage is often claimed to have a positive impact on the reliability
of supply in high-pressure gas systems. However, the modelling and quantiﬁ-
cation of this impact has been explicitly investigated only in few publications
so far. In [52] the critical durations of pipeline storage in a high-pressure
nitrogen supply system were computed. The authors combined the critical
durations with stochastic simulations of compressor station failure and re-
pair times to ﬁnd global reliability indices. Focusing on large-scale natural
gas transmission systems, [29] presents a procedure combining Monte Carlo
simulations with hydraulic transient analysis for the purpose of quantifying
system reliability.
In addition to these publications, several studies investigate the transient
nature of ﬂow in natural gas transmission systems subject to variations
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in demand and availability of sources and compressors, such as in [53, 54].
However, these generally emphasise on selected scenarios rather than ﬁnding
reliability indices.
5.3 Storage in Natural Gas Pipelines
The storage of natural gas in a pipeline bij is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. Assume
that the pipeline ﬂow is at steady-state, and that the minimum pressure
requirement pminj at the receiving node j and the maximum pressure re-
quirement pmaxi at the sending node i should not be violated.
The upper solid-drawn line represents the pressure distribution along the
pipeline operating at the maximum inlet pressure pmaxi . Conversely, the
lower solid-drawn line represents the pressure distribution when meeting
the minimum outlet pressure pminj . In between these curves, the stapled
line represents a pressure distribution p(x) associated with an inlet pressure
pi.
pmaxi
pmini
pmaxj
pminj
pi
pj
p (x)
Xij
δx
x
Figure 5.2: Illustration of storage in a pipeline bij where ﬂow is at steady-
state.
For a given inlet pressure pi it is possible to ﬁnd the total gas volume Vij
contained in pipeline bij as follows:
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Vij =
∫ Xij
0
δV =
A
pb
∫ Xij
0
p(x)δx (5.1)
where:
A = pipeline cross-sectional area
pb = base pressure
Xij = length of pipeline bij
p(x) = pressure distribution along bij
x = distance from pipeline inlet
For the pressure distribution p(x) in Fig. 5.2, Vij is represented as the entire
area under the stapled line. Assuming that pipeline ﬂow is at steady-state,
Vij can be formulated as in (5.2), as derived and described in [55,56].
Vij = k
(
Tb
pb
)(
pD2ijXij
Z T
)
(5.2)
where:
p =
2
3
(
pi + pj − pipj
pi+ pj
)
and:
k = numerical constant
Tb = base temperature
Dij = diameter of pipeline bij
T = average gas temperature
Z = average gas compressibility factor
A certain minimum stored volume V minij is needed in order to supply node j
at pminj . The extra energy storage, represented by the shaded area in Fig. 5.2
is found as V sij = Vij − V minij . In the further discussion, V sij is referred to as
the pipeline storage.
5.4 Survival Time
The survival time of a pipeline system is an estimate of how long the system
is able to serve the connected loads while being fully or partly disconnected
from its upstream sources.
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In the following we deﬁne the survival time STij of a single pipeline bij as
the time it takes to fully discharge the pipeline’s storage V sij, assuming a
constant load Lj at node j and no upstream supply:
STij =
V sij
Lj
(5.3)
This is a simpliﬁed method for computing the gas pipeline survival time,
only considering a steady-state picture of pipeline ﬂow before and after the
storage has been discharged. Similar simpliﬁed methods are often used in
the industry, approximating the transient behaviour of discharging gas from
a storage [33,57,58].
5.4.1 Example: Survival Time of a Pipeline
Consider a pipeline bij having a length of 100 km, where the remaining
pipeline parameters are as in the case study presented in Publication D.
The pipeline’s survival time STij is found by using (5.3), and is plotted as
a function of load Lj for some selected inlet pressures pi in Fig. 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Survival time of pipe bij plotted as a function of load Lj for
some selected inlet pressures pi.
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A diﬀerent approach for ﬁnding survival times was applied in Publication D,
relying on transient simulations of gas ﬂow. Generally, the survival times
found using the two diﬀerent approaches were relatively close, deviating no
more than 30 %.
5.5 Markov Approach for Pipeline Storage
This section presents a basic Markov model suitable for capturing the eﬀect
of pipeline storage in reliability analysis of natural gas pipeline systems.
Energy storage in a pipeline can be considered a back-up system being
forced into operation in case upstream supply to the pipeline is interrupted.
A reliability block diagram illustrating the modelling of storage is shown
in Figure 5.4. It should be noted that the storage denoted Sij does not
represent a physical connection between nodes h and i, but rather the func-
tionality of the stored energy in pipeline bij in terms of reliability. Let h be
the source node and j the load node. If branch1 bhi fails, there is no topo-
logical connection between the source h and the load j. However, Fig. 5.4
illustrates that j is served from Sij. The storage has a limited capacity de-
scribed by its survival time STij . The Markov model presented in Fig. 5.5
enables us to estimate the basic reliability indices for load point j subject
to a failure of the upstream branch (bhi).
h i j
Upstream Supply (bhi)
bij
Storage (Sij)
Figure 5.4: Reliability block diagram with respect to energy supply from
node h to node j.
5.5.1 Storage Failure Rate
The storage Sij in Fig. 5.4 is deﬁned to have failed once it is fully discharged,
i.e. V sij = 0. Thus, the storage survival time found in Section 5.4 can be
1The term branch is used to indicate that bhi may in principle be any network com-
ponent.
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understood as the mean time to failure (MTTF) and the storage failure rate
is deﬁned as the inverse of MTTFSij :
λsij =
1
STij
=
1
MTTFSij
=
Lj
V sij
(5.4)
5.5.2 Markov Model
The state space diagram shown in Fig. 5.5 represents the connection between
nodes h and i in the reliability block diagram in Fig. 5.4. Let U denote the
upstream supply to node i provided by bhi and S denote the energy storage
Sij in pipeline bij . Failure and repair rates for branch bhi are denoted λu
and µu, respectively. Similarly, failure and repair rates of the storage are
denoted λs and µs. Load point j will experience an interruption if the
upstream supply is faulted and the storage is fully discharged. Thus, state
3 in Fig. 5.5 represents the failure state.
U
√
S
√
U ×
S
√ U ×
S ×
U
√
S ×
1
2 3
4
λu λu
µu µu
λs
µs
Figure 5.5: A Markov model incorporating upstream supply U and pipeline
storage S. Functionality is either operating (
√
) or faulted (×).
5.5.3 Assumptions
The state space diagram in Fig. 5.5 represents a continuous and dynamic
process as a time-homogeneous Markov process with only four states. A
process should show two properties to be considered a time-homogeneous
Markov process [59]:
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1. Memoryless – When the present state of the process is known, the
future development of the process is independent of anything that has
happened in the past. The process is said to have no memory.
2. Stationary – The probability of transition from one state to another
is independent of time; the process has stationary transition probabil-
ities.
Thus, for the presented Markov model to be valid, certain assumptions
were made, as discussed in detail in Publication D. In short, the major
assumptions concern:
Constant load and fixed operator strategy: To fulﬁl the second prop-
erty stated above, the storage failure and repair rates should be con-
stant. Thus, load must be considered constant whenever the storage
is being discharged and repaired. Alternatively, several load states
could be incorporated in the Markov model, as described in Publica-
tion D. Furthermore, it is assumed that the operator aims at meeting
a predeﬁned upstream pressure corresponding to a given storage level.
This assumption guarantees a constant storage repair rate.
Binary storage representation: State 2 represents the system with a
faulted upstream supply (U) and a pipeline storage being discharged.
If U is repaired before the storage is fully discharged, the system tran-
sits back to state 1, representing an operating U and a fully charged
storage. However, the storage has been partially discharged while re-
siding in state 2 and its charge level is actually unknown. Therefore,
the binary storage representation is an optimistic assumption.
Repair of upstream supply: The repair rate of U has to be path inde-
pendent and hence, the transition rates from state 2 to 1 and from
state 3 to 4 are identical. One could argue that the repairing of the
compressor is being started as soon as state 2 is encountered, giving a
higher rate from 3 to 4 than from 2 to 1. The assumption of identical
repair rates can be understood as a worst case assumption, necessary
to guarantee path-independent transition rates.
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5.5.4 Reliability Indices
It is possible to derive analytical expressions for the basic reliability parame-
ters of load point j in Fig. 5.4 subject to the failure of upstream supply (bhi).
The probability of load point j being interrupted equals the probability of
being in state 3 (pr3):
pr3 =
λuλs (λu + µs)
(µu + λu) (µuµs + µsλs + λuλs)
(5.5)
The expression in (5.5) can be simpliﬁed by making two assumptions. First,
it is assumed that µs ≫ λu. This assumption is sound given that the
operator always aims at keeping a predeﬁned storage level. Second, we
assume that µu ≫ λu, which is normally the case for the types of repairable
components being considered here. The simpliﬁed formulation is:
pr3 =
λu
µu
× λs
λs + µu
(5.6)
The average interruption rate λj (in interruptions/year) and the average
annual outage time Uj (in hours/year) for load point j subject to failure of
the upstream unit can be formulated as:
λj = µu × pr3 = λuλs
λs + µu
=
λu
1 +
STij
ru
(5.7a)
Uj = 8760 × pr3 = λjru (5.7b)
Where ru = 8760 × µ−1u is the repair time of the upstream unit. All rates
are given per year, and ru and STij are given per hour.
For a pipeline bij with negligible storage, STij ≈ 0. In this case, the basic
reliability indices found from (5.7) correspond to the ones described by (2.1)
in Chapter 2.
5.5.5 Model Extensions
The basic Markov model presented in Fig. 5.5 was extended to incorporate
three load levels and a reserve upstream supply unit in Publication D. These
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extensions are not further treated here, and it is referred to Publication D
for coverage of these model extensions.
5.6 Modelling Storage in Pipeline Networks
The presented modelling approach can in principle be extended to gas
pipeline networks having a radial structural topology. Consider the gas
transmission network in Fig. 5.6 transporting gas from a source at node 1
to the load points at nodes 4-6. All transmission pipelines are equipped with
remotely operated valves at both ends, to quickly isolate a faulted pipeline.
1 2 3 4
5 6
Figure 5.6: A gas transmission network connecting a source and three load
points.
Knowing the minimum pressure requirement pmin at all load points and
the operating pressure p1 at the source node, it is possible to estimate the
storage V sij in each pipeline. Assuming constant loads, the steady-state
network ﬂows and pressures are easily found. Now Vij can be estimated for
each pipeline using (5.2).
Finding V minij for all branches is more challenging. An approach follow-
ing the strategy of a depth-ﬁrst search is suggested below. In a depth-ﬁrst
search, branches are explored out of the most recently visited node which
still has unexplored downstream branches. For the network in Fig. 5.6 a
depth-ﬁrst search could e.g. explore the branches in order {b12, b23, b34, b36,
b25}. Each time a node j which does not have unexplored downstream
branches is reached, V minij and p
min
i are computed, where i denotes the par-
ent node of j. In case node j is a load point, this computation is straight-
forward as pminj was predeﬁned for all load points. Otherwise, if j is not
a load point, the highest value of pminj is used in the further calculations.
Consider being at node 3 having visited branches b34 and b36. We want to
ﬁnd V min23 and p
min
2 , but there are two diﬀerent computed values of p
min
3
5.6. Modelling Storage in Pipeline Networks 59
from previous visits to nodes 4 and 6. By choosing the highest value of
pmin3 , V
min
23 refers to the minimum amount of gas in pipeline b23 required to
maintain the minimum pressure at both downstream load points. Finally,
in accordance with Section 5.3, the storage V sij in each pipeline is found as
the diﬀerence between Vij and V
min
ij .
In case a pipeline fails, it is isolated by valves at each pipeline end, leaving
all load points downstream the faulted pipeline without connectivity to the
source. However, the loads are temporarily supplied by the accumulated
storage in the pipelines downstream of the faulted pipeline. This feature
is illustrated in the reliability block diagram in Fig. 5.7. Each pipeline bij
having a set of downstream pipelines Bds and downstream load points N dsL
has been paired with a storage equivalent Seqij . The storage equivalent S
eq
ij
represents the accumulated storage in the pipelines downstream bij.
The survival time of the storage equivalent is deﬁned as:
ST
eq
ij =
∑
b∈Bds V
s
b∑
k∈N ds
L
Lk
(5.8)
1 2 3 4
5 6
b12 b23
b34
b 2
5
b 3
6
S
eq
12 S
eq
23
Figure 5.7: Reliability block diagram with respect to energy supply from
the source to the load points.
5.6.1 Example: Network Storage
It is possible to extend the application of the analytical simulation procedure
applied to gas networks, as described in Publication B, to include the impact
of pipeline storage.
A numeric example was performed for the network in Fig. 5.6. It was
assumed that each pipeline fails once a year and that it takes 12 hours to
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repair the faulted pipeline, hence λu =1 year
−1 and ru =12 hours. The
equivalent survival times were set to:
ST
eq
12 =
V s
23
+V s
34
+V s
36
+V s
25
L4+L5+L6
= 3 hours
ST
eq
23 =
V s
34
+V s
36
L4+L6
= 2 hours
To relate these survival times to a physical pipeline, the reader could refer
to Fig. 5.3.
Table 5.1 shows how the reliability parameters for the load points are accu-
mulated when considering the failure of each pipeline. Interruption rates are
in interruptions/year and outage times in hours/year. For comparison, in
case pipeline storage is ignored, the calculated average annual outage time
for load points 4 and 5 are 36 hours/year and 24 hours/year, respectively.
Table 5.1: Average interruption rates and annual outage times.
Load pt 4 Load pt 5 Load pt 6
Failure λ4 U4 λ5 U5 λ6 U6
b12 0.800 9.600 0.800 9.600 0.800 9.600
b23 0.857 10.286 0.857 10.286
b34 1.000 12.000
b25 1.000 12.000
b36 1.000 12.000
TOT 2.657 31.886 1.800 21.600 2.657 31.886
5.7 Application to District Heating Systems
In resemblance to high-pressure natural gas pipeline systems, energy storage
in DHSs is signiﬁcant and should be considered in reliability studies. This
issue was discussed in Publication D, and it was suggested to apply the
Markov model in Fig. 5.5 to DHSs.
However, operational diﬀerences between the two systems indicate that the
Markov model is less suited for the DHS. Unlike the NGS, the DHS is not
normally operated with an extra amount of energy in the pipelines. This
is not considered a viable option from an operational point of view, since
thermal losses increases with increasing ﬂow and supply temperature. Thus,
the DHS
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The idea presented in Publication D was to continue circulating ﬂow in a
pipeline even with no operating upstream thermal power production units.
This was also brieﬂy discussed in Chapter 4, illustrated by considering the
production unit TP faulted in Fig. 4.3. Although the interruption at the
downstream load point will be delayed by continue circulating the water,
the transition from state 2 to 1 in Fig. 5.5 may be misleading. While
residing in state 2 the load is consuming thermal power, creating a thermal
power deﬁcit in the pipeline. In case the system returns to state 1 without
visiting state 3, this deﬁcit will continue travelling and eventually reach the
load, causing a ’dip’ in temperature. For this reason, the Markov model
in Fig. 5.5 may provide unrealistic results by overestimating the impact of
pipeline storage in the DHS.
62 Pipeline Storage
Chapter 6
Closure
6.1 Summary
This thesis presents novel methods for assessing reliability of supply and de-
pendency in three diﬀerent energy distribution systems. Serving as a general
framework, conventional network models of the distribution systems were
developed. The suggested methods are founded on these network models
and were all tested on diﬀerent test systems or in case studies.
The contributions can be grouped according to their thematic belonging:
Reliability of supply: The contribution described in Chapter 3 (Publi-
cation B), concerning reliability evaluation of natural gas distribution
systems, is based on state-of-the-art reliability calculations from the
electric power domain. Network constraints and the expected oper-
ator responses to diﬀerent failure modes were considered. It is the
application area rather than the modelling approach that forms the
novel contribution. In contrast, Chapter 5 (Publication D) describes
a new modelling approach incorporating pipeline storage in reliabil-
ity evaluation of high-pressure natural gas pipeline systems. Pipeline
storage was considered a subsystem being forced into operation once
the upstream supply to a load point fails. The storage failure rate was
found, and then the basic reliability parameters were obtained from a
Markov model.
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Dependency between systems: Two of the contributions concern de-
pendency between systems. First, dependency at load level was mod-
elled in Chapter 2 (Publication A). Introducing a second energy carrier
in an area dominated by electric power, will aﬀect the type of energy
end-uses served by the electric power system. An optimisation prob-
lem was formulated, ﬁnding the optimal allocation of switchgear in
an electric power distribution system. It was shown how changes in
energy end-uses cause changes in the expected customer interruption
costs, which in turn aﬀect the optimisation problem. Second, the de-
pendency of district heating systems on electric power was modelled in
Publication C. Network models of the two systems were coupled and
the consequences of higher-order power system failures were quantiﬁed
for both systems.
The methods developed in this thesis were all tested on ﬁctitious small-
scale test systems. The intention by doing so was to demonstrate the basic
functionality, clarify the underlying assumptions and allow for the presented
results to be reproduced. In addition, some of the methods were tested on
larger test systems presented in the international scientiﬁc community, such
as [23, 37]. As far as possible, the test system data has been published or
referenced.
6.2 Potential Applications
The potential applications of the contributions from this thesis are in the
following areas:
 Reliability evaluation of natural gas systems. By using the approaches
in Chapters 3 and 5, it is possible to quantify the basic load point
reliability indices in natural gas networks, including the impact of
pipeline storage.
 Detailed studies of the changes the electric power system faces when
introducing a second energy carrier in an area. By using the method
in Chapter 2, a network company can analyse whether the allocation
of switchgear is appropriate according to the end-uses served by the
electric power system.
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 Integrated planning of co-existing energy distribution systems. The
increasing awareness of integrated planning has resulted in several
new tools and methodologies to support the planning process [48,60,
61]. So far, these mainly concern operational optimisation and do
not consider reliability of supply. The reliability evaluation approach
for natural gas distribution systems in Chapter 3 and the simpliﬁed
thermal power-ﬂow model in Chapter 4 could provide useful input in
this context.
6.3 Concluding Comments
The main conclusions may be summarised as follows:
 It is possible to include considerations regarding the type of end-uses
served by the electric power system when assessing the optimal allo-
cation of switches in the system. A method suitable for this task was
presented and applied to test networks.
 Structural and operational similarities between electric power and nat-
ural gas distribution systems justify the application of reliability mod-
elling techniques from the electric power domain to the latter.
 The explicit dependency of the district heating system on electric
power can be represented by couplings between network models of
the two systems. In this way the cascading consequences of power
system failures in the district heating system are quantiﬁed.
 The impact of pipeline storage on reliability of supply in natural gas
pipeline systems can be quantiﬁed by means of a Markov model.
These conclusions rely on a number of assumptions, as stated in the publi-
cations and throughout the previous chapters. Generally, these assumptions
serve to simplify the presented solution procedure and to avoid distracting
attention from the novel method or problem formulation.
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6.4 Future Work
Some possible subjects for further work are presented below:
Further testing: The contributions described in this thesis were tested
on diﬀerent test systems. A natural step ahead would be to further
test the methods in realistic case-studies and discuss the approach,
assumptions and results with the relevant stakeholders.
Treatment of constraints: Network constraints are generally treated as
absolute in this work. An alternative approach would be to treat these
as soft constraints, penalising constraint violations.
Computational performance: Some of the presented algorithms could
be improved with respect to computational speed, and in some cases
replaced with more eﬃcient algorithms. The topic of computational
performance has not been addressed here, but should be considered if
further testing and development of the presented methods is desirable.
Accuracy of steady-state assumptions: The models computing ther-
mal power ﬂow in district heating systems and storage in natural gas
transmission pipelines, are both steady-state representations of highly
dynamic system behaviours. In order to test the accuracy of these
models, they could be more thoroughly compared with transient ﬂow
simulations.
System couplings: Physical couplings between systems were described
for the case of electric power and district heating systems in this
work. More sophisticated couplings, allowing back-up systems to act
as safety barriers could be included in the presented model. Moreover,
other system-couplings, e.g. between electric power and natural gas,
could be modelled as well. Inspiring ideas are presented in [62].
Appendix A
Flow in Pipeline Networks
This chapter presents a method appropriate for finding nodal pressures and
pipeline flows in meshed pipeline networks comprising various network com-
ponents. First, two basic ways of formulating the flow problem are presented.
Subsequently, a specific method, known as the Newton nodal-loop method is
elaborated.
A.1 Introduction
This chapter is basically a compilation of a section in a comprehensive book
on analysis of gas networks [63], presenting the Newton nodal-loop method
in detail. The method was selected based on its robustness to variations in
network topology and nodal input. The presented method has been tested
on selected natural gas and water distribution networks in [37,51,63].
Equation (A.1) is generally valid1 for gaseous and liquid ﬂow in a pipeline,
assuming isothermal, steady-state ﬂow.
Qb = KbSb
[
Sb(p
2
i − p2j)
] 1
γ (A.1)
1Note that a number of modified and specialised equations provide increased accuracy,
depending on fluid properties and flow conditions.
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where:
Qb = mass ﬂow in pipeline b
Kb = pipeline constant for pipeline b (dependent on pipeline
dimensions, environmental conditions, ﬂuid properties, etc.)
Sb = 1 if pi ≥ pj
Sb = -1 if pi < pj
pi = pipeline inlet pressure
pj = pipeline outlet pressure
γ = ﬂow exponent (normally ∼ 2)
A network comprises a set N of N nodes and a set B of B branches. Each
node i ∈ N may be associated with a certain load Li, having a positive
reference out of the network. For the network in Fig. A.1, nodes 1 and 6
are injecting, whereas nodes 2-5 are consuming mass ﬂow.
1
2
3
4
5
6
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
Figure A.1: A network comprising nodes and branches.
A.2 Nodal Formulation
A network, such as the one in Fig. A.1, is described by a branch-nodal in-
cidence matrix A (dim N ×B), where the elements are deﬁned as:
aib =


+1 if branch b enters node i
−1 if branch b leaves node i
0 if branch b is not connected to node i
A.3. Loop Formulation 69
The nodal balance is formulated for each node in the network:
AQ = L (A.2)
where:
Q = mass ﬂow vector, dim B
L = nodal load vector, dim N
In short, the Newton nodal method ﬁnds the pipeline ﬂows based on an
approximation of nodal pressures. Then Q is found from (A.1), before
nodal mismatches are found in (A.2). Subsequently, pressure corrections
are found with help from a linearised version of (A.1).
A.3 Loop Formulation
It is possible to improve convergence characteristics and make the solution
less sensitive to initial conditions by expressing the nodal pressures in a
pipeline as a function of ﬂow, and updating ﬂows. Thus, (A.1) can be
reformulated:
∆Pb = p
2
i − p2j = Kˆb|Qb|Qγ−1b (A.3)
where:
Kˆb = pipeline constant for pipeline b (dependent on pipeline
dimensions, environmental conditions, ﬂuid properties, etc.)
The number of loops l in the network is given by l = B − N + 1. For the
network in Fig. A.1, there are l = 8− 6 + 1 = 3 loops. Note that the loops
are not unique. The sum of pressure drops around each loop equals zero,
thus:
E∆P = 0 (A.4)
where:
E = branch-loop incidence matrix, dim l ×B
∆P = vector of pressure drops in branches, dim B
In short, the Newton loop method approximate the loop ﬂows. Then∆P is
found from (A.3), before loop mismatches are found in (A.4). Subsequently,
loop ﬂow corrections are found with help from a linearised version of (A.3).
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A.4 Newton Loop-node Method
The Newton loop-node method as described here, combines the nodal and
the loop formulations from Subsections A.2 and A.3. Comparing the New-
ton loop-nodal to the nodal method, the former has better convergence
properties, since (A.3) is linearised rather than (A.1). While (A.3) is nearly
quadratic (γ ∼ 2), (A.1) has a near square-root term (γ−1 ∼ 12 ). Compar-
ing the Newton loop-nodal method with the loop method, the advantage
of the former is that loops in the network do not have to be explicitly deﬁned.
Nodal pressures are represented by vector P (dim N). The branch pressure
drops are found in (A.5)
∆P = −ATP (A.5)
By linearising (A.3), the following expression holds true:
∆P = ΦQ (A.6)
where Φ (dim B×B) is a diagonal matrix having entries for each branch b:
φb =
∂(∆Pb)
∂Qb
= Kˆb|Qb|γ−1 (A.7)
By combining (A.2),(A.5) and (A.6), Q can be eliminated to obtain:
GP = −L (A.8)
where:
G = AΦ−1AT
The matrixG represents the network without non-pipeline elements. Adding
U non-pipeline units and setting the ﬂow through each unit as a positive
demand at the inlet node and negative demand at the outlet node, (A.8)
can be rewritten:
GP = −L−Kf (A.9)
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where the entries in matrix K (dim N × U) are:
kiu =


+1 if the uth unit has its inlet at node i
−1 if the uth unit has its outlet at node i
0 otherwise
The vector f (dim U) describes the ﬂow through each unit.
Equation (A.9) can be reformulated as:
[
GN Gˆ K
I
GˆT G˙ KO
] P˙P
f

 = − [ LI
LO
]
(A.10)
Consider U units having outlet nodal pressures p1, p2, ..., pU . Pressures at
the remaining nodes are p˙1, p˙2, ..., p˙V , where V = N−U . Rows and columns
have been permuted from the original matrix G in (A.9); GN (dim V × V )
represents pipeline-pipeline connections, Gˆ (dim V × U) represents unit-
pipeline connections and G˙ (dim U × U) represents unit-unit connections.
Furthermore, KI (dim V × U) is the inlet part and KO (dim U × U) the
outlet part of the K matrix.
In order to solve (A.10), a description of each unit’s performance should
be incorporated. The ﬂow though a unit and the corresponding inlet and
outlet pressures can be formulated as:
aP˙ + bP + cf = d (A.11)
The coeﬃcients a, b, c and d may vary with time. For example, if the outlet
pressure is kept constant at Pset, then a = c = 0, b = 1 and d = Pset. This
is the typical performance of a regulator station in a natural gas system. In
case the upstream pressure becomes lower than Pset, the regulator can turn
fully open so that a = b = 0, c = 1 and d = fupstream. Generally (A.11) can
be formulated as:
C1P˙+C2P+C3f = d (A.12)
where dim C1 = (U × V ), dim C2 = (U × U), dim C3 = (U × U) and
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dim d = (U × 1). This gives the ﬁnal formulation:

 GN Gˆ KIGˆT G˙ KO
C1 C2 C3



 P˙P
f

 = −

 LILO
d

 (A.13)
Equation (A.13) is solved iteratively, until convergence is obtained for the
values in P˙, P and f .
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Interruption Cost on Optimal Allocation of Switchgear in Constrained Dis-
tribution Networks. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, accepted for
future publication.
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Impact of Energy End Use and Customer Interruption
Cost on Optimal Allocation of Switchgear in
Constrained Distribution Networks
Arild Helseth and Arne T. Holen, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The introduction of new energy carriers, such as
natural gas and district heating, to energy systems dominated by
electrical power will certainly relieve stress on the power system.
Some of the end uses initially served by the power system will be
gradually decoupled and served by alternative energy carriers. As
a result, the specific customer interruption costs and load profiles
will change. In this paper, we analyze how the optimal level of
switchgear in electric power distribution systems is affected by
such changes. The proposed optimization method is based on a
genetic algorithm and takes into account the constrained network
capacity.
Index Terms—Customer interruption cost, genetic algorithms
(GAs), network constraints, power distribution protection, power
distribution reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE basic function of the power distribution system is tosupply customers with electrical energy as economically
as possible and with an acceptable degree of reliability. Con-
sequently, obeying the two conflicting objectives of economics
and reliability is the main challenge when constructing new or
expanding existing distribution systems. Several countries, in-
cluding Norway, have carried out extensive surveys with the
purpose of eliciting the economical losses experienced by dif-
ferent customer groups due to power interruptions. In this way,
reliability can be quantified in terms of a monetary value, and
the worth of any investment in the power system may be found
through a cost-benefit analysis [1].
Electrical power is the dominating energy carrier in the Nor-
wegian energy system. By introducing alternative energy infra-
structures, such as natural gas and district heating, some of the
energy end uses may be decoupled from the power system. As
a result, the electrical load profile will change and the demand
for electrical power will decrease.
Will this shift in demand affect the optimal level of invest-
ments in reliability-enhancing projects? Intuitively, a relief in
demand for electrical power will lead to decreased interruption
consequences since less power has to be transported to the cus-
tomers. Thus, the optimal level of investment in reliability will
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decrease, compared to the case where electricity serves all end
uses. Furthermore, load relief on tightly constrained distribu-
tion feeders may improve the ability to restore service through
reserve connections in the network, resulting in system relia-
bility improvement without additional investments. On the other
hand, consumer surveys reveal that the end use that can only be
covered by electricity tends to have a higher associated cost of
interruption. These conflicting momentums are all incorporated
in an optimization method presented in this paper.
Finding the optimal number and location of switchgear in
radial distribution systems is a complex problem which has
been approached by several authors [2]–[8]. The problem may
be classified as a combinatorial optimization problem having
a nonlinear and nondifferentiable objective function. Various
techniques have been applied to solve the optimal configuration
problem (e.g., dynamic programming [2], binary programming
[3], simulated annealing [4], direct search [5], and genetic
algorithms (GAs) [6]–[8]).
The presented methodology applies a GA for the purpose of
optimizing the number of automated and manual switching de-
vices in a prerouted, radial distribution system. The energy end
uses are divided in two categories: those that can only be pro-
vided by the power system and those that can be provided by any
energy infrastructure. Different interruption costs are applied for
these two categories. The impact of reduction in demand and
changes in the load profile on the optimization problem is ana-
lyzed and discussed. By performing this type of study, a network
company may analyze whether the amount and configuration of
switchgear is appropriate according to the end-use specific in-
terruption costs and load profiles.
II. INTERRUPTION COSTS
Different customer sectors apply electricity for different end
uses. Surveys from various countries show that each customer
sector will evaluate the loss of a service differently, depending
on the end uses the customer sector typically covers by elec-
tricity and the interruption duration [1]. Customers put more
emphasis on the cost and inconvenience associated with the in-
ability to perform their activities due to an interruption rather
than the energy which is not supplied.
In Norway, the regulation scheme cost of energy not supplied
(CENS) adjusts the revenue of the network companies in accor-
dance with the customers’ interruption costs [9]. The expected
CENS is calculated as the product of the annual expected en-
ergy not supplied (EENS) and a specific interruption cost in
(1 Euro 8 NOK). The applied CENS rate
is sector dependent, but independent of interruption duration.
0885-8977/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE
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Fig. 1. Sector customer damage functions for Norwegian customers.
TABLE I
RELATIVE CONSUMPTION AND INTERRUPTION COST FOR THE COMMERCIAL
CUSTOMER SECTOR
For more detailed system planning, it is believed that the
nonlinear profile of interruption costs as a function of inter-
ruption duration should be accounted for. Such profiles are
conveniently displayed in sector customer damage functions
(SCDFs). SCDFs are created by aggregating the cost functions
of individual customers in the same customer sector. The
SCDFs for the six different customer sectors used in Norway
are shown in Fig. 1, based on an extensive survey conducted
by the Institute for Research in Economics and Business Ad-
ministration (SNF) and SINTEF Energy Research [10]. When
studying the SCDFs in Fig. 1, one should keep in mind that the
consumers in Norway generally apply electricity to cover all
energy end uses.
Additional accuracy may be added by assigning one SCDF
for each distinctive end-use category, as represented in (1).
Examples on typical end-use categories are shown in the first
column of Table I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(1)
Where is the SCDF for customer sector and is the
cost associated with the inability to serve end-use category
during a period . In this matrix, different end-use categories
and different interruption duration periods are displayed. All
end-use categories are aggregated in Fig. 1 , thus every
is represented by a vector.
Alternative energy carriers, such as district heating and nat-
ural gas, are able to cover some of the same end uses as electrical
power. An extensive discussion of the different end uses is not
within the scope of this paper; thus, we will aggregate end uses
in two major categories
End-use category: Covered by:
Electric power system
Any energy infrastructure
Obviously, the category of flexible end uses contains different
services depending on the energy carrier. Natural gas may, for
example, be used for cooking, but this end use cannot easily
be provided by the district heating system. Furthermore, a low
supply temperature in a district heating system may exclude the
possibility of serving certain thermal end uses.
In the survey described in [10], respondents of some selected
customer sectors were asked to estimate the cost associated
with the loss of ability to perform activities in selected end-use
categories and the annual energy consumption related to each
end-use category. These data refer to non-notified interruptions
at a given reference time (weekday in January). Data for the
commercial customer group are presented in Table I and will
be used in the subsequent sections of this paper. The end-use
categories of space heating, hot tap water, and electrical boilers
are defined as flexible end uses.
It is evident that the inability to perform electricity specific
end uses has a higher associated cost than is the case for flexible
end uses for the commercial customer sector. Unfortunately,
the survey does not give sufficient information to display the
end-use specific interruption costs as a function of interruption
duration and present accurate corresponding matrices
as described in (1) for the two aggregated end-use categories.
However, for the purpose of illustrating the suggested method,
some new SCDFs were created. The original SCDFs shown in
Fig. 1, are now denoted as . Based on and the
weighting factors and defined in (2), a new SCDF matrix
, was constructed from (3). For all values of interrup-
tion duration, (4) should be fulfilled
Cost
Consumption
Cost
Consumption
(2)
(3)
Consumption Consumption (4)
Generally, the services related to the flexible end-use cate-
gory are less affected by short interruptions than the services
related to the electricity specific end use (e.g., due to thermal
inertia of buildings and the presence of storage tanks for hot tap
water). Consequently, it is likely that the shape of the SCDF for
the flexible and electricity specific end-use categories will differ
for low values of interruption duration. In order to reflect the
differences in shape for the two end-use categories, it is simply
assumed that interruptions of the flexible end use having a dura-
tion of less than mins will not be noticeable for the customers.
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Fig. 2. SCDF for the commercial customer sector.
Accordingly, is set to be equal to zero and is changed so
that (4) is fulfilled.
A new SCDF matrix for the commercial customer sector
was constructed from (3). By using data from
Table I, the weighting factors become and
. and are displayed in
Fig. 2, with .
It should be noted that the difference between the electricity
specific and the flexible end-use categories shown in Fig. 2
was found to be particularly large for the commercial customer
sector and was less evident for the remaining customer sectors.
III. LOAD DURATION CURVES
In power distribution networks with constrained capacity,
load-flow studies will reveal whether the network constraints
are met before system reconfigurations are performed. Es-
timates of reconfiguration capability are normally based on
system peak load and, thus, contributes to a conservative
estimate of the reliability of the network. For more detailed
reliability studies, load duration curves (LDCs) should be
applied. A LDC comprises load data plotted in a descending
order of magnitude, where each load level has a corresponding
probability of occurrence.
The LDCs for the electricity specific and the flexible end-use
categories differ significantly in shape due to different consump-
tion patterns throughout the year. LDCs for the sum of all end
uses and the electricity-specific end uses ,
based on hourly peak load measurements from a typical Norwe-
gian commercial-sector customer, are shown in Fig. 3. In order
to analyze the possible influence that the differences in shape
have on the optimization problem, two 10-step load duration
curves and were created based on the
data presented in Fig. 3. These curves are used in the subse-
quent calculations and their corresponding numerical values are
shown in Table II.
We now assume that the load duration curve from
Fig. 3 is representative for the commercial customers who con-
tributed to the survey in [10].
As previously shown in Table I, the electricity-specific
end-use category requires 66% of the total energy demand for
the commercial customer group. Assuming that this end-use
category adheres to the , the maximum power required
Fig. 3. Load duration curve for the commercial customer sector.
TABLE II
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR 10-STEP LOAD DURATION
CURVES FOR THE COMMERCIAL CUSTOMER SECTOR
is 66% as well. However, by using the displayed in
Fig. 3, the maximum power requirement is only 55% of the total
maximum power. Thus, applying the correct load curve may
influence the reconfiguration capability of constrained feeders
which, in turn, may influence the outcome of the optimization
problem.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Deciding the optimal level of switchgear in a radial dis-
tribution system is a combinatorial optimization problem.
The solution space is constrained by the type and amount of
switchgear available. We consider two categories of switchgear
in this optimization procedure: 1) the automatically operated
switch (AOS) and 2) the manually operated switch (MOS).
Fuses are also modelled, but their locations have been prede-
fined. The presented optimization procedure treats the switch
allocation problem as an independent subproblem, without
addressing reinforcement or downsizing of distribution system
equipment. It is believed that equipment downsizing should be
included for a more detailed analysis, and that this feature may
be added modularly to the presented procedure.
A. Switchgear
A short and general description of the functionality of the
switchgear applied in the proposed model will follow. An AOS
will automatically isolate a faulted section of a distribution cir-
cuit once an upstream circuit breaker or recloser has interrupted
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the fault current. An MOS is operated manually by a repair crew
and is capable of opening and closing a circuit when negligible
current is broken or made. The AOS and MOS have no ability
to break fault currents; thus, they will not impact the frequency
of interruptions experienced by the customers [11]. Fuses are
overcurrent protection devices which are usually located at the
beginning of distribution laterals. Once a fuse has melted and
operated due to a downstream fault, it requires replacement be-
fore the protected lateral can carry load again.
B. Assessing Load-Point Reliability
An analytical simulation approach is applied to assess
load-point reliability [12]. Radial distribution systems may
be modelled as tree data structures comprising a set of nodes
and branches. The failure of each system component is sim-
ulated and interrupted load points are classified in distinctive
classes depending on interruption time. A two-stage restoration
strategy is modelled, as described in [13]. First, a limited set
of load points is restored by using the available AOSs. These
load points experience an interruption of duration equal to the
automatic sectionalizing time and belong to class A. Second,
additional load points are restored by using MOSs. These load
points experience an interruption duration equal to the manual
sectionalizing time and belong to class B. Load points which
are not restored before the faulted component has been repaired
or replaced belong to class C. In case node voltages drop
below a preset minimum level due to reconfiguration,
the solution is rejected and alternative switch operations are
sought. This procedure is repeated for all load levels and all
contingencies.
The reliability assessment procedure is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
• the distribution system is radially operated;
• only first-order contingencies are considered;
• all switchgear is 100% reliable;
• all switchgear is properly coordinated;
• temporary failures are not considered;
• a circuit breaker is always located at the root of each tree
(i.e., at the substation of the distribution system).
C. Illustrative Example
The following example illustrates the logic of a two-stage
restoration strategy. Furthermore, a discussion on the impact of
introducing alternative energy carriers on reliability is given.
Consider the simple radial shown in Fig. 4, comprising five
busbars (bb1–bb5), branches (B1–B5), load points (L1–L5),
switches (S1–S5), and a circuit breaker (CB). Assume that
switches S2, S4, and S5 are AOSs and the remaining switches
are MOSs, that S1–S4 are normally closed and that S5 is
normally open. The reserve connection through feeder 2 (F2)
is capable of supplying L4 and L5 at the given load level. Both
flexible and electricity specific end uses are served by the power
system.
In case of a permanent fault on branch B2, the restoration al-
gorithm will first request that CB and S2 open to isolate B2.
The intention is then to close S5, establish the reserve con-
nection through feeder F2, and restore supply to load points
L3–L5. However, due to the feeder constraints, the load-flow
Fig. 4. Simple distribution system radial.
study will reveal that the suggested operations result in violated
feeder constraints and the algorithm will search for the next
AOS downstream S2, which is S4. No constraints are violated
this time; thus, CB and S4 are opened to isolate B2 and restore
service to L5. Subsequently, the second stage of the restoration
is initiated, requesting that the MOSs S1 and S3 open and that
CB and S4 close to further limit the isolated area. Again, the
network constraints are not violated, and L1 and L4 are restored
by performing the requested operations. Load points L2 and L3
will not be restored until B2 has been repaired. Consequently,
load point L5 belongs to class A, L1 and L4 to class B, and L2
and L3 to class C.
Assume that the flexible end uses of load points L4 and L5 are
detached from the power system and served by a local heat sup-
plier. There is now the possibility that, after a permanent fault
on B2, S2 can open so that L3–L5 are restored without violating
feeder constraints. Load points L3 and L4 will then belong to
class A and, thus, experience improvement in reliability. Both
the explicit load reduction and the change in aggregated profile
of the feeder load are factors that may trigger the change in re-
configuration capability.
D. Genetic Algorithms
GAs are search algorithms based on the mechanics of natural
selection and natural genetics. A GA does not rely on the as-
sumption of linearity, differentiability, continuity, or convexity
of the objective function.
A simple binary GA was defined for this optimization
problem by using the Java package JGAP [14]. Initially, the GA
randomly creates a population of feasible solutions. Each solu-
tion is a string of binary variables in which each bit represents
the presence (1) or absence (0) of switchgear in a predefined
location in the distribution network. The possible locations of
switchgear are predefined according to a set of rules. Branches
are divided in two types: 1) primary and 2) terminal branches.
Terminal branches are directly connected to the load points
and are equipped with fuses at their sending ends. Primary
branches are not directly connected to load points. A switch
may be allocated at the sending end of each primary branch. In
Fig. 5, switch S1 on branch B1 is represented by the bits {1,0}.
The first bit indicates the presence of the switch and the second
bit is the absence of automatic control. Similarly, S2 is present
and is controlled automatically. Thus, the primary branches
B1 and B2 in Fig. 5 have the presence of an MOS and AOS,
respectively.
The next generation of solutions is chosen based on the rules
of probability theory and the fitness (objective function) of each
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Fig. 5. Possible locations of switchgear on two primary branches.
solution. The further search for an optimal solution is governed
by the three basic operators of reproduction, crossover, and mu-
tation. A thorough description of the basic operators of the GA
may, for example, be found in [15].
The expected customer outage cost (ECOST) relates the reli-
ability of each solution to a monetary value
(5)
number of steps on the LDC;
number of components;
number of load points;
probability of load step ;
average failure rate for component ;
, Boolean variables for load point ;
total load at step of the 10-step LDC
for load point ;
electricity specific load at step of the
10-step LDC for load point ;
specific outage cost related to all end
uses for the customer group at load point
given the outage time ;
specific outage cost related to the
electricity specific end use for the
customer group at load point given the
outage time .
In case all end uses are covered by electricity at a load point ,
and in (5). Conversely, if only the electricity
specific end use is covered by electricity, and .
The optimization procedure can be represented as in (6), where
is the total annualized capital cost for switchgear
Minimize (6)
It should be noted that the GA has no convergence guarantee
in arbitrary problems. In order to improve the convergence prop-
erties, hybrid GA schemes incorporating local search techniques
may be constructed. In this study repeatability of the results was
used as a convergence guarantee.
V. SYSTEM STUDIES
In order to test the suggested optimization procedure and the
impact of shifts in SCDFs and LDCs, the radial distribution
Fig. 6. Distribution system for RBTS bus 5.
system connected to bus 5 of the Roy Billinton Test System
(RBTS) was designated as a test system [16], [17]. Failure rates
and repair times are given in [16]. Customer data, feeder lengths,
and load data are given in [17]. Manual and automatic switching
time was set to 1 h and 1 min, respectively. The peak loads
given in [17] were all increased by 40%. The annualized cap-
ital cost for an AOS and an MOS was set to 12 000 and 8000
NOK/year, respectively. Fig. 6 shows the original version of the
test system, where feeders (F1–F4), load points (LP1–LP26),
branches (1–43), and normally open switches (NO1–NO2) are
labeled.
The system was tested for five different combinations of
SCDFs and LDCs. For all simulations, the minimum voltage
was set to 0.95 p.u. Case 1, which is the base case,
assumes that the power system supplies all load. The remaining
four cases assume that all of the commercial customers (load
points 7, 14, 18, 22, and 24 in Fig. 6) have their flexible end
use provided by other energy carriers than electric power. The
SCDFs and LDCs used for the commercial customer sector
were displayed in Fig. 2 and Table II, respectively. All other
load points were associated with the SCDFs shown in Fig. 1
and they were assumed to follow the from Table II.
Table III shows the results of the optimization procedure for
the different combinations of SCDFs and LDCs. The character
following the switch number indicates the selection of an
AOS, while indicates an MOS. The corresponding ECOSTs
and ICOSTs are shown in Fig. 7.
As expected, the results indicate that the ECOST decreases
when the commercial customer–sector load is decoupled from
the power system. By using the nonadjusted SCDF and LDC
for the commercial customer sector in case 2, this decrease is
15.1%. A further comparison between cases 1 and 2 reveals that
although the selected locations of switches in the two cases are
essentially the same (except from the switch at branch 41), the
number of AOSs is considerably higher in the base case.
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TABLE III
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF SWITCHGEAR FOR THE PRESENTED CASES
Fig. 7. ECOST (gray) and ICOST (black) for the presented cases (1 kNOK =
1000 NOK).
Marginal changes in ECOST and switch configurations were
found when changing the LDC for the commercial customers
from case 2 to case 3. The reduction in ECOST, shown in Fig. 7,
is a result of the improvement in reconfiguration capability. We
also note that the AOS on feeder F3 has changed its location
from branch 30 to branch 28.
The optimal allocation and selection of switches is clearly
affected by the choice of SCDF. As shown in Table III, the total
number of selected switches and the number of AOSs in case
4 is similar to the base case. Taking the final step to case 5,
where both the SCDF and LDC have been adjusted, we see that
the ECOST decreases compared with case 4, again due to the
increased reconfiguration capability. A similar pattern as found
when going from case 2 to case 3 is seen from 4 to 5; AOSs are
now located more centrally on feeders F3 and F4. By adjusting
the SCDF and LDC, the decrease in ECOST from case 1 to case
5 is 5.9%, which is considerably less than the decrease found
from case 1 to case 2.
Table IV presents the average annual outage time at some se-
lected load points for the optimal configurations found in cases
1, 2, and 5. It is evident that most load points will experience
a reliability improvement in terms of lower expected annual
TABLE IV
AVERAGE ANNUAL OUTAGE TIME
FOR SOME SELECTED LOAD POINTS
outage time, when going from nonadjusted data in case 2 to ad-
justed data in case 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presented method makes it possible to analyze how the
optimal allocation of switchgear in electric distribution systems
is affected by decoupling the flexible end use from the system.
In particular, the changes in customer interruption costs and
load profile have been studied, and it is shown how they in-
fluence the optimal allocation of switchgear. This method is
useful for configuration studies of distribution networks in areas
where alternative energy carriers and sources replace electricity
as providers of thermal energy services.
The amount of switchgear allocated in the presented test
system was reduced when the flexible end use was decoupled.
However, by using customer interruption costs and load dura-
tion curves adjusted according to the electricity specific end
use, the reduction was not as evident as found when using
aggregated data. The test study showed that the choice of SCDF
has a more significant impact on the optimization problem than
the choice of LDC. In less constrained networks, the impact of
adjusting the LDC may be neglected.
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Abstract— Due to the introduction of alternative energy car-
riers, such as district heating and natural gas, the Norwegian
energy system is becoming more complex. Assessing the reliability
of electrical distribution systems is a mature field of research, but
limited work has been carried out concerning the reliability of
distribution systems for alternative energy carriers. This paper
proposes a methodology for assessing the reliability of natural
gas distribution systems based on experiences drawn from similar
analysis of electrical power distribution systems. A simple test
case is presented for illustrative purposes and the basic load-point
reliability indices of average interruption rate, average outage
time and average annual outage time are found.
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy consumption in Norway is primarily covered
by electricity. Introduction of alternative energy carriers in the
energy system, such as natural gas and district heating, are
supported by the government and is expected to increase in
the future.
Planning the coexistence and interconnection of the existing
power system and emerging alternative energy infrastructures
on a regional level is a complex task involving multiple
criteria. Reliable access to energy is one important criterion,
but it is not easy to quantify. Traditionally, reliability of
supply in electrical power distribution systems (EPDS) has
been assessed systematically by models and methodologies
[1]. This paper attempts to apply the methodology from the
domain of electrical power systems for reliability assessment
of natural gas distribution systems (NGDS).
The physical structure of gas networks has several analogies
to that of electrical power systems. Natural gas is carried
from one or several sources to the consumers through trans-
mission and distribution networks. High transmission pressure
ensures efficient and economic transportation of gas to the
load centers, where the pressure is reduced stepwise to meet
the requirements of the distribution system and the consumers.
In resemblance to EPDS, NGDS in urban areas are often
meshed structures being operated radially. One feature that
differentiate the behavior of electrical power and natural gas
systems is the ability of the latter to store energy (gas) both
in the pipeline network and in separate storages in order to
optimize system performance and reliability. However, since
the ability to store gas in the network is limited at lower
pressure levels, transient behavior of gas flow is not considered
in this work.
Reliability evaluation of natural gas transmission networks
has been addressed by several authors [2]–[6]. Inspired by
the framework for reliability assessment of electrical power
system, [2] suggested dividing the natural gas system into
three functional zones, where facilities of gas production,
transmission and distribution are evaluated at hierarchical
levels. Authors [3]–[5] applied Monte Carlo simulations to
assess the availability of sufficient compression facilities in
the transmission system to meet the consumer load. In [6]
the loss of supply due to transmission pipeline failures was
minimized and the security of a gas network was assessed.
The criterion of secure operation was fulfilled whenever the
pressures at all load points did not fall below their respective
minimum levels.
Natural gas and power systems can be coupled, e.g. through
gas-fired power plants and compressors based on electricity. A
framework for assessing interconnected energy infrastructures
was presented in [7]. Impact models of the natural gas trans-
mission network on the electrical power system were presented
in [8], [9].
The objective of this paper is to propose a method for
assessing reliability of supply in NGDS. An illustrative case
study is presented and the basic load-point reliability indices
of average interruption rate, average outage time and average
annual outage time are found. It is discussed how the results
can serve as an input to a reliability assessment of the coupling
between NGDS and EPDS.
II. THE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM
A. System description
In typical on-shore natural gas systems, gas is transported
from the source to the consumers through a network of
pipelines comprising many pressure levels. Transmission sys-
tems are characterized by few pipelines and high operating
pressure. Compressor stations are used to maintain the desired
pressure in the transmission network. As an intersection point
between the transmission and the distribution system, the
measuring and regulating station (MR-station) meters the gas
and reduces its pressure so that it is suitable for distribution
purposes.
Distribution systems may comprise up to three pressure
levels, depending on the design policy of the distribution
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company. In this work, only two pressure levels are con-
sidered: the high pressure (HPDS) and the medium pressure
distribution system (MPDS). Feeder mains carry gas from
MR-stations to regulator stations in the HPDS. The pressure
is reduced in regulator stations, and the gas is conducted
through distribution mains in the MPDS. Service lines are
used to connect the consumers to the distribution mains. Large
consumers may be connected directly to the HPDS or even the
transmission network.
Valves are installed along the distribution system to allow
sectionalizing and reconfiguration of the network for mainte-
nance and network expansion. Some valve types also protects
against excessive pressure and backflow. Valves are automat-
ically, remotely or manually operated, depending on pressure
level and operating philosophy. In case of emergencies in
networks with manual valves, the use of clamps for fault
isolation may reduce gas escape and the number of affected
consumers.
Pressure is reduced from the HPDS to MPDS level by
means of a regulator station. Regulators are used to control
the pressure of a certain section of the distribution system. If
the upstream pressure of the regulator station becomes lower
than the preset downstream pressure, the regulator will turn
fully open. In addition, the regulator station should protect the
downstream distribution system against excessive pressures.
Primarily, this is taken care of by the regulator itself, but if
this device fails, additional devices, such as shut-off valves
and relief valves, are used to lower downstream pressure. The
regulator station should be designed to operate independently
of other infrastructures. Fig. 1 shows a schematic drawing of a
typical regulator station with redundant processing lines. Each
processing line comprise the following major components:
filter (1), shut-off valve (2), regulator (3) and relief valve (4)
[10].
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Fig. 1. Regulator station
B. Network flow analysis
Natural gas is a compressible medium and the transmission
operator will take advantage of the ability to store gas in the
pipelines. This storage capacity, termed line pack, can improve
the reliability of the system whenever a source is unavailable
or lack of compression facilities occur. The effect of line
pack decreases with decreasing operating pressure, and for
practical purposes steady-state simulation is a sufficient tool
for calculating post-contingency flows and pressures.
For the purpose of calculating pipe flows and nodal pres-
sures in both meshed and radial NGDS, the Newton loop-node
method described in [11] is applied. Regulators are modeled
to provide a preset downstream pressure.
Unlike the case for power systems, where Ohm’s law is valid
independently of voltage level, different flow equations applies
to different pressure levels in gas networks. For simplicity,
the Polyflo flow equation is assumed valid over the range of
pressures levels considered.
p2i − p2o = KQ1.848n (1)
pi = pipeline inlet pressure [bar]
po = pipeline outlet pressure [bar]
Qn = pipeline gas flow [m3/h]
K = constant (function of pipeline length, diameter
and friction)
Nodal pressures and pipeline flows must satisfy the appropriate
flow equation, and together with the specified values for loads
and sources, the first and second of Kirchoff’s laws must be
fulfilled.
C. Quality of supply
The quality of the gas served to the consumers depends on
the following properties:
• Odor
• Chemical properties
• Pressure
Natural gas is colorless, odorless and tasteless and has an
odorant added to aid the detection of leaks by making the gas
easy to detect by smell. Thus, proper odorization is important
for safety reasons, but will not directly affect the reliability of
supply. Chemical properties are usually evaluated before the
gas is supplied to the transmission network. At distribution
level these are considered constant. Different consumers and
end-uses require pressure to be within different specified
ranges at their respective points of delivery. Experience shows
that low-pressure conditions in healthy distribution systems
develop gradually, whereas excessive pressures at load points
are more of a short-term problem [10]. Only pressure will be
used as a measure of the quality of supply in this paper, and
only minimum pressure requirements are considered.
D. Power production
Power producing units can either be added to the transmis-
sion or distribution system depending on size and purpose.
A cogeneration plant produces both electricity and heat and
may be sited in the NGDS. Several cogeneration technologies
based on natural gas are available, such as reciprocating
engines, turbines and micro turbines. Cogeneration plants are
in most cases operated according to the heat demand; thus,
the introduction of small cogeneration units in the NGDS will
not alter the load profile significantly.
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Large gas-fired power plants are sited in the natural gas
transmission system and may change the load profile of the
system dramatically, as it undergoes the dispatching logic of
the power system operator. These plants depend upon high gas
pressure at their delivery points and are in general susceptible
to pressure drops. The importance of transient simulation for
gas network adequacy assessment with the presence of large
gas-fired power plant is highlighted in [12].
Integration of distributed generation in the electrical distrib-
ution system makes network operation more complicated. As
small cogeneration units will not naturally be included in a
generation dispatching logic, they may not be relied on alone
to serve an electric load. However, they will be running on
maximum power in the winter months and may provide a
useful relief to any power system under stress [13].
III. RELIABILITY MODELING
A. Definitions and assumptions
There are basically two unwanted events in a NGDS:
1) Gas escape
2) Consumer loss of supply
Uncontrolled release of natural gas or loss of pressure in
the system can cause unsafe situations due to the potentially
explosive mixture of gas and air. This may be contrasted with
electricity, where, in the event of loss of supply, the system
itself is considered safe. For the purpose of assessing reliability
of supply, the event of consumer loss of supply should be
quantified.
Generally, interruptions in NGDS can be classified as
planned or unplanned. Planned interruptions are related to
necessary maintenance or upgrade of the gas system, whereas
unplanned interruptions may be caused by various incidents.
A thorough treatment of failure causes is outside the scope of
this paper, however, examination of past distribution pipeline
failure records reveals that exterior mechanical interferences
are the main causes of failures in NGDS [6], [14].
The proposed reliability model is based on the following
assumptions:
• NGDS are radially operated
• Only pipeline ruptures and regulator station failures are
considered
• Only first-order contingencies are considered
• Valves are considered fully reliable
• Each load point requires a minimum pressure Preq in
order to be supplied sufficiently
• Valves are remotely controlled in HPDS and manually
operated in MPDS
• Regulator stations are remotely controlled and can isolate
a faulted radial immediately
• A regulator station failure will cause interruption of all
downstream consumers
If a failure occurs, reconfiguration of the network requires a
sectionalizing time of rb. Consumers that can not be suffi-
ciently supplied after the reconfiguration will experience an
outage time equal to the total time of repair rc.
Given this set of assumptions, the physical and operational
similarity of NGDS and EPDS justifies adoption of techniques
from the latter for assessment of reliability in NGDS. An
analytical simulation approach as described in [15] has been
used as a reference for the proposed method. The effect of
constrained network capacity is added.
B. Method description
A method for finding the basic reliability parameters of
average interruption rate, average outage time and average
annual outage time in a NGDS is proposed and illustrated
in Fig. 2. Let NW |0k describe the network with component
k down. All load points connected to the same radial as k
loose supply and belongs to class B or C. The remaining
load points belongs to class A and are not affected by the
failure. If possible, the network is reconfigured and load points
can be supplied alternatively while the faulted component is
repaired. After reconfiguration, the pressure Pi at each node
i is computed. Each load point is characterized by a required
pressure Preq(i). If Pi < Preq(i), load point i will not be
sufficiently served and will belong to class C. Load points that
can be sufficiently fed after reconfiguration belongs to class B.
When all network components have been selected, each load
point is classified (A-C) for the selected contingency and the
reliability parameters are computed and aggregated.
Start
Reconfigure network
Evaluate pressure at 
each load point
Select network 
component
Stop
More components?
Is i on the faulted 
radial?
Is Pi>Preq? Class B
Class A
Class C
NO
YES
NO
Fig. 2. Classification of load points
If valves are automatically or remotely controlled, consumer
interruptions may be avoided for load points belonging to class
B due to the effect of line pack. Clearly, this behavior is
different from the case of EPDS where no such storage effects
can be counted for in reliability analysis.
C. Basic reliability parameters
The basic reliability parameters are first calculated for the
HPDS. By considering each regulator station as a load point
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with a pressure requirement Preq, the reliability parameters
can be aggregated to the MPDS. A detailed reliability study
of regulator stations is outside the scope of this paper, and
for simplicity each regulator station is assigned a failure rate
of λRS . When one regulator station experiences an upstream
failure or is faulted itself, all downstream consumers are
expected to experience an interruption. Consequently, this
procedure gives a pessimistic estimate of load point reliability
since load transfer at regulator station level is not accounted
for.
For the network analysis at a given pressure level, all load
points are evaluated for each contingency. Load point i sited
on the radial j will be interrupted each time an failure of
component k belonging to j occurs.
Load point average interruption rate [interruptions/year]:
λi =
∑
kǫj
λk (2)
Load point average annual outage time [h/year]:
Ui =
∑
kǫB
λkrB +
∑
kǫC
λkrC (3)
rB - expected time of reconfiguration
rC - expected time of repair
Load point average outage time [h/interruption]:
ri =
Ui
λi
(4)
D. Cogeneration
Cogeneration plants are coupling points between the NGDS
and EPDS. Generally, cogeneration plants have three failure
modes [13]:
1) Unit failure
2) Scheduled maintenance
3) Lack of fuel
The reliability parameters found for a cogeneration load-point
can be used as input in reliability studies of the interconnection
between NGDS and EPDS.
IV. CASE STUDY
A simple illustrative gas distribution network is shown in
Fig. 3. The network comprises a MR station which serves
as the source, a HP distribution system, two regulator station
(R1 and R2) and four load points (A-D). Normally closed
sectionalizing valves are black and normally open valves are
white. All valves shown in Fig. 3 are remote controlled, except
the sectionalizing valve in the MPDS. A cogeneration plant is
located in load point C. The operating pressures are 10 and
4 bar at HP and MP distribution levels, respectively. Only
pipeline ruptures and regulator station failures are considered.
Isolation of ruptures are done with clamps or manual valves in
the MPDS and by remote controlled valves at HPDS. HPDS
reconfiguration is assumed to occur without delay. Pipeline
parameters and load data are listed in Table I and II.
The expected regulator station and pipeline failure rates
(λRS and λP ), the sectionalizing time (rB), pipeline repair
4
6
7
8
5
9
10
11
Transmission HP distribution MP distribution
R1
R2
MR
1
2
3
12
A
B
C
D
Fig. 3. Gas distribution network
TABLE I
LOAD AND REQUIREMENTS
Load Point Load[m3/h] Preq[bar]
R2 3000 4
A 200 2
B 200 2
C 150 3
D 200 2
time (rC) and regulator station repair time (rRS) are listed
below. The resulting reliability parameters are shown in Table
III.
λRS = 0.05 /year
λP = 0.2 /year·km
rB = 3 hours
rC = 48 hours
rRS = 96 hours
Assume now that the sectionalizing valve connected to
pipeline 9 in the MPDS is open during normal operation,
i.e. the MPDS is operated as a loop. In order to minimize
the amount of gas escape due to any pipeline ruptures in the
MPDS, regulator station R1 will have to shut off supply to both
of the connected distribution mains. Based on this assumption,
the reliability parameters for load points A and C in a loop-
operated MPDS are calculated and shown in Table IV. The
average annual outage time of load points A and C is expected
to increase with 23% and 11%, respectively, compared to a
radially operated MPDS.
In case the NGDS have abundant capacity, the basic re-
liability parameters can be found analytically based on the
reliability topology and (2)-(4) without evaluating nodal pres-
sures. In capacity constrained networks, evaluation of post-
contingency pressures will verify whether the reconfigured
network sufficiently supplies each load point.
If pipeline 5 is taken out of service, the reconfigured
network will not be able to sufficiently supply the CHP plant
(PC =2.5 bar and Preq(C) =3 bar), and it is assumed that
the plant has to be disconnected. In this case study, failure of
pipeline 5 is the only contingency where a load point which
is connected to the source after reconfiguration can not be
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TABLE II
PIPELINE DATA
Line Length[km] Diameter[mm]
1 10 160
2 10 200
3 3 160
4 5 120
5 5 120
6 3 200
7 3 100
8 5 100
9 2 100
10 3 100
11 5 100
12 3 100
TABLE III
RELIABILITY PARAMETERS
Load point A C (CHP)
Component λ r U λ r U
R1 0.05 96 4.8 0.05 96 4.8
4 1.0 3 3
7 1.0 3 3
5 1.0 48 48
11 1.0 3 3
6 0.6 48 28.8
8 0.6 3 1.8
10 0.6 48 28.8
12 0.6 3 1.8
Total 3.3 12.7 41.4 3.3 26.6 86.4
served its required pressure. For analysis of complex, capacity
constrained gas networks, a load shedding policy should be
added to the presented method. Another approach is to apply
more than two classes when classifying the faulted load points,
e.g. finding if load points are served 100%, 99-50% or 50-0%
of its required pressure after reconfiguration, but before any
load points are disconnected. Similar reasoning is found in
reliability studies of water distribution systems [16].
The remote operation of valves in the HPDS ensures that
single contingencies of lines 1-3 will not affect the reliability
parameters. In case pipeline 1 or 2 are out of service, pipeline
3 is activated by opening the normally closed valve shown
in Fig. 3. Under normal operating conditions, gas is stored
in pipeline 3 to avoid loss of pressure in case of outages
of pipeline 1 or 2. It should be noted that other operating
philosophies may be applied to this case, e.g. when consider-
ing the valve status on pipeline 3. The HPDS may be operated
as a loop, or pipeline 3 may be depressurized during normal
operation of the system. However, none of these changes will
significantly influence the calculated reliability parameters.
TABLE IV
RELIABILITY PARAMETERS
Load point A C (CHP)
λ r U λ r U
Total 6.5 7.9 51.0 6.5 14.9 96.0
V. CONCLUSION
A method for reliability assessment of NGDS based on
techniques and methodology developed for EPDS is proposed.
The rationale behind the comparison of these two systems is
founded on the similarity in operating and network expansion
philosophy. On the other hand, some essential differences
should be counted for in order to find realistic reliability
indices. The suggested method is based on an analytical
network model taking into account the effect of sequential
restoration and constrained network capacity. A simple case
is presented for the purpose of calculating the basic reliability
parameters in a NGDS with constrained network capacity.
Although limited reliability data are available for studies
of NGDS, the importance of quantifying the reliability of
these systems separately and in coexistence with other energy
infrastructures should be stressed. In this way, the reliability
improvements associated with expansions, such as building an
extra loop in the network or using remotely controlled valves,
could be substantiated.
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Abstract—In this paper a method for assessing the struc-
tural vulnerability of two coupled energy distribution systems
is proposed. The co-existing of an electric power distribution
system and a district heating system is described and modelled,
under the assumption that the operation of the district heating
system is directly dependent on electric power. The structural
vulnerability of the two systems subject to single failures or a
set of simultaneous failures in the power system is found. Thus,
the consequences of power system failures for the energy supply
as a whole are quantified.
Index Terms—Power distribution, district heating, vulnera-
bility, reconfiguration, network constraints, genetic algorithms
(GAs), linear programming
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability analysis of electric power systems is a rather
mature field of study, covering all essential parts of the system
[1], [2]. Analysing simultaneous failures in addition to single
failures at distribution level will normally not significantly
influence the reliability indices, due to low probability of
occurrence and modest increase in consequences. Thus, most
methods for reliability analysis of distribution systems focus
on single failures.
On the other hand, simultaneous failures may be a result of
extraordinary circumstances – such as adverse weather, mali-
cious attacks and loss of supporting infrastructures – and will
challenge the use of both human and equipment resources. The
occurrence of simultaneous failures are not easily predicted
and the use of generic failure rates and repair times may not
be appropriate for analysing the system impact of these. In this
work we emphasise on finding the consequences of multiple
simultaneous failures, leaving considerations on probability of
occurrence and duration of such failure sets to the judgement
of the analyst.
Interruptions of electricity supply may also degrade the
performance of parallel energy infrastructures, e.g. district
heating and natural gas systems, which are more or less
dependent on electricity for proper operation. Consequently,
in order to capture the consequences of power system failures
for the energy supply as a whole, these parallel infrastructures
and their links to the power system should be modelled.
In this paper a method for assessing the structural vulnera-
bility of two coupled energy distribution systems is proposed.
The overall aim is to find the vulnerability of the energy
system as a whole to single or simultaneous failures in the
power system. The structural vulnerability of the systems with
respect to failures in the power system is defined as the
consequences caused in both systems. Thus, the concept of
vulnerability, as defined here, is not related to the probability
of such failure sets to occur.
Several recent studies have addressed the concept of vul-
nerability in electric power systems, ranging from graph
theoretical investigations in [3]–[5] to investigations based on
more physical models in [6], [7]. These studies all refer to
the transmission system, and there is a large gap between the
applied definitions of vulnerability. In [8], the vulnerability to
failures at distribution level is analysed using a network ana-
lytic approach. Here, the electrical properties of the network
are neglected and vulnerability is defined as the degree of loss
or damage to the system when exposed to a perturbation of a
given type and magnitude.
Some studies have been conducted regarding infrastructural
dependency modelling. In [9] a general overview of different
kinds of interdependencies in critical infrastructures is given.
A network analytic approach is presented in [10], identifying
vulnerabilities in local distribution systems of electricity, nat-
ural gas and water. Furthermore, [11] and [12] describe and
analyse the impact of natural-gas system reliability on electric
power transmission systems.
The proposed method is described and illustrated for an
electric power distribution system (EPDS) co-existing with
a district heating system (DHS). The operation of the DHS
is directly dependent on electricity. The following section
describes the system modelling approach and the correspond-
ing underlying assumptions for both the EPDS and DHS.
Section III presents a screening strategy used for finding the
most critical failure sets in the EPDS. A limited number of
failure sets are fully analysed for both systems. In section IV,
a simple example is elaborated, before the method is applied
in a case study in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODELLING
Two simple systems, an EPDS and a DHS, are presented
below, and a method suitable for finding the systems’ vulner-
abilities to failures in the EPDS is elaborated. Both the EPDS
and the DHS are modelled as networks, comprising a set of
nodes N and a set of branches B, following an object-oriented
modelling approach.
A. Vulnerability Measure
Various indices may be applied for quantification of con-
sequences associated with interruption of energy supply in
the two systems. In this study, the frequency and duration
of interruptions are not calculated, and the consequences are
simply described in terms of interrupted electric and thermal
power for the EPDS and the DHS, denoted CEPDS and
CDHS , respectively. It should be noted that other relevant
system indices, e.g. indices related to the number and type
of consumers having their supply interrupted could easily be
incorporated in the presented method.
B. Electric Power Distribution System
Fig. 1 resembles a simple EPDS, comprising nodes 1-8 and
branches b1-b9. The system serves seven load points (nodes 2-
8). All branches have switches at their sending and receiving
ends, see illustration in the top-right corner of Fig. 1. Branches
b3 and b9 are load-transfer branches, having normally open
switches at both ends. Node 1 represents the energy in-feed
point, typically being a HV/MV substation.
Permanent branch and node failures in the EPDS have
the potential to interrupt the service to load points. Gener-
ally, two distinctive types of interruptions may be classified,
depending on interruption duration. Some load points will
have their supply restored after a network reconfiguration,
while others will have to wait for the repair of one or more
of the faulted components. This study only considers the
consequences caused by the latter type of interruption. Thus,
an idealised system representation with instantaneous network
reconfiguration is assumed.
The following assumptions were made when analysing the
EPDS:
• temporary failures are not considered;
• all switchgear is fully reliable;
• upstream supply from HV/MV substations is fully reli-
able;
• load points are either fully supplied or not supplied at all.
Moreover, it was assumed that faulted load-point nodes
will be isolated by the operation of a fuse, see illustration in
Fig. 1. Thus, only power supply to that particular node will be
interrupted. The further studies only consider branch failures
in the EPDS.
For each failure set in the EPDS, the following steps are
taken to find the system consequences CEPDS :
1) Isolate the faulted branches by using the available
switches
2) Run a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to find the optimal use
of switches to minimise CEPDS subject to the following
constraints:
a) nodal voltages are not lower than a predefined min-
imum value at load nodes i; ∀i ∈ N : Vi ≥ Vmin
b) branch thermal limits are not exceeded for any
branch b; ∀b ∈ B : Ib ≤ Ib,max
detail:
switch
fuse
b1
b2
b3
b4 b5 b6
b7
b8
b9
1
2 3
4 5 6
7 8
Fig. 1. A simple electric power distribution system.
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2
3
4
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8
Fig. 2. A simple district heating system.
c) the system is radially operated
The GA was modelled using the simple genetic algorithm,
thoroughly described in [13], from the library GAlib [14].
C. District Heating System
A simple DHS is presented in Fig. 2, comprising the
following nodes; two thermal power production units (nodes
1 and 8), two pumps (nodes 4 and 6) and four load points
(nodes 2, 3, 5 and 7). The system is operated as a meshed
system, i.e. water may flow in all pipelines in Fig. 2.
It is possible to formulate the thermal power flow in a
DHS as a function of network temperatures and pressures. In
order for the system to satisfy consumers’ needs, water with
adequate temperature and pressure must be circulated to the
load points.
In this study, only DHS node failures caused by loss of
supply from the EPDS are analysed. DHS pipelines and valves
are assumed fully reliable whenever the EPDS has faulted
components. Loosing electric power supply to nodes in the
DHS may result in insufficient circulating pressure and/or
insufficient thermal power production, which in turn may
cause interruption of supply to DHS load points. Note that
short interruptions of electric power supply to DHS nodes are
not treated here, as EPDS reconfiguration is assumed to take
place instantaneously. Short electric power interruptions have
the potential to trip DHS pumps leading to thermal power
interruptions. However, this kind of analysis calls for dynamic
system studies and is outside the scope of this paper.
Pressure and temperature distribution studies may be decou-
pled and performed separately. Changes in pressure are quickly
transferred throughout the whole system, typically taking only
a few seconds. Temperature changes are slower and closely
related to the speed of the circulating water. However, as this
study is not concerned with the duration of interruptions, we
do not differentiate between the interruptions caused by lack
of pumping capacity and those caused by lack of thermal
power production capacity. It is generally assumed that repair
of faulted components in the EPDS is slower than the dynamic
response of the DHS. Thus, only steady-state considerations
of thermal power flow are dealt with in this work.
It is assumed that all DHS nodes can be isolated and
bypassed. Consequently, in case a thermal power production
unit or pump lacks supply from the EPDS, the hot water is
simply bypassed this unit without any increase in temperature
or pressure. Furthermore, in case load has to be curtailed in the
DHS due to a deficit in thermal power production or pumping
capacity, it is assumed possible to bypass any load point in
the system. Depending on which node types that are without
electric power, different types of analysis are performed, as
described below:
1) DHS pump: If supply from the EPDS to a DHS pump
is lost, the pump is bypassed and load points in the DHS will
experience a drop in pressure. An initial study of pressure
distributions reveals whether load point pressures are suffi-
cient, i.e. higher than a predefined minimum value pmin. If
this constraint is not met, load has to be disconnected. A GA
is initiated for the purpose of minimising the consequences
(CDHS) of load curtailment in the DHS while meeting the
pressure requirement.
2) DHS production unit: If supply from the EPDS to a
DHS thermal power production unit is lost, a capacity deficit
may occur in the DHS. Rerouting of thermal power flow may
also enforce bottlenecks in the DHS. The thermal power flow
problem is formulated as a mixed integer programming (MIP)
problem using the linear programming library GLPK [15].
The formulation relies on a lossless, steady-state network flow
model. The problem formulation is stated as:
MIN.:
CDHS =
∑
i∈N
(1− xi)Di (1a)
S.T.: ∑
j:(ji)∈B
P tb(j,i) −
∑
j:(ij)∈B
P tb(i,j) +Gi − xiDi = 0
(1b)
|P tb | ≤ P tb,max (1c)
Gi ≤ Gi,max (1d)
Where xi is a boolean variable indicating whether load
point i is served or not, and CDHS denotes the total amount
of interrupted thermal power. Restriction (1b) describes the
nodal thermal-power balance for each node i, where B is the
collection of all branches in the DHS, P t
b(i,j) denotes thermal
power flow in branch b connecting nodes i and j, and Gi and
Node
EPDS_Node
DHS_Node
EPDS_LoadPoint
DHS_PumpDHS_LoadPoint DHS_Production
1
0..*
Fig. 3. Class diagram illustrating the node hierarchy.
Di are the thermal power production and demand at node i,
respectively. Restriction (1c) forces the thermal power flow in
each branch not to exceed the capacity constraint P tb,max for
that branch. Gi is constrained by its maximum power Gi,max
in (1d).
3) DHS load point: Normally the DHS will interface with
aggregated load points trough a heat exchanger, and water is
circulated in an underlying secondary circuit supplying smaller
loads. Loosing electric power at this location will disable the
circulating pumps in the secondary circuit, and consequently
the entire aggregated load point will be interrupted. However,
the surrounding system is not directly affected by such local
effects.
D. Modelling Dependencies
Fig. 3 shows an excerpt of the Unified Modelling Language
(UML) class diagram for the node hierarchy applied in the
joint modelling of the two systems. Instance variables and
functions are omitted for brevity.
Each node in the DHS (DHS Node) has a link to one load
point in the EPDS (EPDS LoadPoint) in Fig. 3. Each EPDS
load point has an association to zero, one or several DHS
nodes. DHS nodes comprise load (DHS LoadPoint), pump
(DHS Pump) and production unit (DHS Production) nodes.
In case an EPDS load point experiences an interruption, the
model checks for associated DHS nodes. If associated DHS
nodes are found, the consequences are analysed depending on
the type of faulted DHS node(s), as previously described.
III. FAILURE SET SYNERGY
Applying the presented method to large scale infrastruc-
tures analysing higher-order failure sets is computationally
intensive. A screening strategy inspired by [16] was applied
in order to fully analyse only the most critical failure sets.
Thus, computation time is reduced as well as the number of
failure sets to evaluate after the simulation has been performed.
The strategy is based on the concept of synergy, as explained
below.
Consider the EPDS under study consisting of n components
being subject to a failure set Fki . The failure set is set number
i of order k. The maximum number of failure sets of order k
is found by (2).
ikmax =
n!
(n− k)!k! (2)
In case k is larger than 1, it will be possible divide Fki into
a certain number of divisions, where each division comprises
the same components as in Fki . Consider a set of order
3, comprising components a, b and c. There are 4 possible
divisions (d1 − d4) of F3(abc) , as shown below.
F3(abc)


d1 : F2(ab) +F1(c),
d2 : F2(ac) +F1(b),
d3 : F2(bc) +F1(a),
d4 : F1(a) +F1(b) + F1(c)
If Fki gives rise to larger consequences (CEPDS) than the
sum of consequences in any of its divisions, Fki is said to
be synergistic. In other words; if Fki is the minimum cut
set for at least one EPDS load point, it will be synergistic.
Thus, the synergy concept relates to network connectivity and
reconfiguration capability of the EPDS.
It is possible to screen higher-order failure sets according
to their synergy. A failure set of order k may cause large
consequences, but if the failure set has no synergy, it indicates
that these consequences were counted for when analysing sets
of lower order. Thus, running the simulation with an increasing
value of k, allows us to emphasise on the synergistic failures
sets.
The screening procedure was implemented in the structural
vulnerability assessment method as illustrated in Fig. 4. First,
the depth of the analysis is set by choosing the highest failure-
set order to be considered (kmax). Determining kmax is the
choice of the analyst, depending on how many simultaneous
failures that are considered feasible. For each k, ikmax is found
from (2). In case the failure set is synergistic and DHS nodes
loose supply from the EPDS, one of the steps described in
Subsections II-C1 - II-C3 is performed, depending on which
DHS node types that are without electricity.
IV. EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the proposed method, an example is
presented based on the two systems shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
The example is limited to EPDS branch failures only, and
failure sets comprising three or less branches. As the EPDS
has 9 branches, there are 129 failure sets in total. For clarity
and simplicity, we assume that the EPDS is unconstrained.
The DHS has no pipeline capacity constraints of type (1c),
but will have to meet a pressure requirement pmin = 0.9 p.u.
at all load points. All load points in both systems serve a load
of 1 MW.
Fig. 5 shows the couplings between EPDS load points and
DHS nodes in this example. The thermal power production
units do not depend on electric power from the EPDS.
A total of 36 failure sets are synergistic; 27 third and 9
second-order sets. These synergistic sets are treated further in
the DHS analysis. A plot of the resulting consequences for the
EPDS (CEPDS) and DHS (CDHS) for the synergistic failure
sets is presented in Fig. 6. Open circles indicate failure sets
of second order and filled circles indicate third-order failure
sets. For each circle in Fig. 6, there is a set of failure sets
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the structural vulnerability assessment method.
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Fig. 5. Dependency of a DHS on electric power. Couplings between EPDS
load points and DHS nodes are indicated by arrows.
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Fig. 6. Interrupted power for both the EPDS (CEPDS) and the DHS
(CDHS). Failure sets of second order are marked with ◦ and third order
with •.
causing this tuple of consequences. For three of these tuples,
the corresponding failure sets are listed in the figure.
As an example, 3 synergistic failure sets will cause the
consequence tuple of CEPDS = 1 MW and CDHS = 1 MW,
as indicated in Fig. 6. If b1 and b2 fail simultaneously, EPDS
node 2 will experience an interruption. According to Fig. 5,
the load point at node 2 in the DHS looses supply from the
EPDS and is interrupted. If b2 and b3 fail, EPDS node 3 will
experience an interruption. This time, the DHS pump at node
4 in Fig. 2 will loose electric power supply. The GA reveals
that the DHS system is only capable of serving 3 out of 4
load points in this state, thus CDHS = 1 MW. Finally, in case
b7 and b8 fail, both the load at node 3 and the pump at node
6 will loose power. As it is assumed that node 3 in the DHS
is bypassed in this situation, the pressure constraints are not
violated and no additional load points in the DHS has to be
curtailed.
Simultaneous failure of b4 and b6 is the most criti-
cal second-order failure set in terms of total consequences
(CEPDS+CDHS). Furthermore, not surprisingly, the third-
order failure set comprising b1, b4 and b7 causes maximum
consequences for both systems.
V. CASE STUDY
The presented method was tested on the coupled EPDS
and DHS located in the city centre of Trondheim, Norway. A
system boundary was defined, including only the central parts
of the two systems. Figs. 7 and 8 present the structure of the
two systems. It should be noted that both system models are
simplified, but still reflect the basic design of the real networks.
The central part of the DHS is shown in Fig. 7. This system
comprises 3 pumps, 8 thermal power production units and 11
load points, and the total installed capacity and maximum load
is 149 MW and 106 MW, respectively. The surrounding EPDS
is a medium-voltage cable network fed by 3 HV/MV substa-
tions and serving 34 load points. The voltage and pressure
constraints were set to Vmin = 0.95 p.u. and pmin = 0.90 p.u.
Couplings between the two systems are mapped as in Fig. 5,
but is not presented here for practical reasons.
Fig. 7. Overview of the central district heating system.
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Fig. 8. Overview of the electric power distribution system. Each branch is
enumerated.
A simulation was performed for failure sets comprising
three or less components, considering only EPDS branch
failures. In total there are 40 first, 780 second and 9880
third-order failure sets. From the simulation it was found
that 12 first, 64 second and 176 third-order failure sets have
synergistic consequences. A scatter plot of the consequence
tuples caused by these synergistic failure sets is presented in
Fig. 9. Consequences are measured in interrupted electric and
thermal power, in percentage of the total load served in each
of the two systems.
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Fig. 9. Interrupted power in percentage of total load for both the EPDS
(CEPDS) and DHS (CDHS). Failure sets of first order are marked with ,
second order with ∗ and third order with ◦.
In Table I the synergistic failure sets causing maximum
consequences, both in terms of CEPDS and CDHS , are listed.
The maximum CEPDS in second and third-order synergistic
failure sets was found to be 27.6 and 36.3 % of the total
load in the EPDS, respectively. For comparison, the maximum
CEPDS in second and third-order non-synergistic failure sets
was found to be 20.0 and 34.0 %.
At most 1.9 % of the DHS load is interrupted due to single
branch failures in the EPDS. This result indicates that the DHS
is not particularly vulnerable to single failures in the EPDS. In
fact, all the major DHS load points, pumps and thermal power
production units can receive power from more than one EPDS
feeder.
Studying the two second-order failure sets listed in Table I,
it is evident that the set causing the highest value of CEPDS
causes only minor consequences in the DHS. On the contrary,
if branches b5 and b16 fail simultaneously, violation of EPDS
network constraints limits the reconfiguration capability, re-
sulting in EPDS load point interruptions. The system is recon-
figured to minimise the interrupted electric power. Cascading
consequences in the DHS are not considered when finding the
optimal use of switches in the EPDS. For this particular failure
set a vulnerable DHS node looses electric power supply, giving
a high value of CDHS .
The third-order failure set comprising branches b1, b12 and
b35 isolates a part of the EPDS which is crucial for proper
DHS operation; thus, more than 50 % of the total DHS load
is interrupted.
TABLE I
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES FOR FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD-ORDER
SYNERGISTIC FAILURE SETS.
Order Maximum Set CEPDS (%) CDHS (%)
1st CEPDS b26 13.7 0.0
CDHS b18 0.0 1.9
2nd CEPDS b11, b26 27.6 6.6
CDHS b5, b16 8.8 18.9
3rd CEPDS b8, b26, b37 36.3 21.7
CDHS b1, b12, b35 23.6 52.8
Although the non-synergistic failure sets are screened out, a
thorough interpretation of the remaining synergistic failure sets
Fsyn can be tedious. Finding the EPDS branches contributing
the most to consequences in Fksyn of a given order k, will
provide a measure of component criticality. The contributionR
to consequences C (CEPDS or CDHS) of branch b is defined
as the ratio between the sum of the consequences caused by
synergistic failure sets including branch b and the sum of
consequences for all synergistic failure sets:
R(b, k) =
∑
F∈F
k
syn,b∈F
[C(F)]∑
F∈F
k
syn
[C(F)]
Table II shows the three components that contributed the
most to consequences (in terms of CEPDS and CDHS) caused
by second-order synergistic failure sets.
TABLE II
BRANCH CONTRIBUTION TO CONSEQUENCES IN SECOND-ORDER
SYNERGISTIC FAILURE SETS.
C = CEPDS C = CDHS
Rank Branch (b) Contr. (R) Branch (b) Contr. (R)
1 b26 0.090 b16 0.115
2 b24 0.075 b20 0.113
3 b20 0.069 b21 0.076
VI. DISCUSSION
In this study, the frequencies and durations of interruptions
were not considered, only the system consequences in terms
of interrupted electric and thermal power. Obviously, before
drawing final conclusions regarding critical components and
possible system reinforcements, one have to somehow evaluate
how often interruptions are expected to occur and for how long
they are expected to last.
Furthermore, the assumptions regarding the two systems’
responses and operations due to failures can be questioned.
It is difficult to generalise such behaviour when the failure
repair time is unknown. For example, loosing power to a
DHS thermal power production unit for a short time, leading
to a short-time capacity deficit in the DHS, will rarely be
noticed by the average consumer. This work relies on the
assumption that electric power interruptions affecting supply
to DHS nodes last longer than the time it takes for the thermal
power flow to reach steady-state. More detailed system studies
could address the dynamic response of the DHS subject to
short electric power interruptions, and the sequence of backing
up or restarting faulted pumps and production units.
In the presented method, the post-failure system configu-
rations are found in two separate steps. First, the EPDS is
reconfigured to minimise interrupted electric power by using
the available switches. Subsequently, in case any DHS nodes
are without power, curtailed thermal power is minimised while
meeting the DHS network constraints. A perhaps more realistic
reconfiguration algorithm would integrate the two reconfig-
uration steps in one procedure. In this way, the cascading
consequences in the DHS are considered when finding the
optimal use of switches in the EPDS. By integrating the
system reconfigurations in this manner, it is likely to expect a
reduction in CDHS and a slight increase in CEPDS for some
failure sets. In the end, the most representative algorithm will
always be the one reflecting the actual communication and
cooperation between the distribution system operators.
Finally, it should be noted that simulating the EPDS as a
partial system may result in a higher measure of structural
vulnerability than in reality, since boundary nodes may be
fed by surrounding system parts. These parts are outside the
system boundary and are therefore not included in the system
model.
VII. CONCLUSION
A method was proposed, suitable for analysing the structural
vulnerability of an electric power distribution system co-
existing with a district heating system. The structural vul-
nerability of these systems with respect to failures in the
power system was defined as the consequences caused in both
systems. The cascading consequences due to loss of electric
power to essential components in the district heating system
was discussed and modelled. The method enables the analyst
to consider higher-order failure sets in the electric power
system and find the consequences caused in both systems.
Furthermore, a screening procedure was applied to identify
and fully analyse only the most critical failure sets.
The method was applied to a case study, where the failure
sets causing the highest consequences were identified. It
was briefly discussed and shown how to rank power system
components in terms of criticality.
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Abstract
This paper presents a novel Markov-based approach for modelling and analysing the impact of pipeline storage on the reliability
of supply in pipeline energy systems. It is described how to calculate the survival time for both natural gas and district heating
systems subject to upstream failures. Storage failure and repair rates are introduced and incorporated in a Markov model. These
rates reflect the system aspect of having storage capacity available, not technical failure and repair of the storage. The approach is
tested on a simple natural gas transmission system, and the results are compared with Monte Carlo simulations. The comparisons
indicate that the model is capable of capturing the impact of pipeline storage on reliability of supply.
Key words: Reliability Modelling, Pipeline, Storage, Natural Gas, District Heating
1. Introduction
In the context of reliability, stored energy can be used for
two purposes. It is used to either provide back-up energy in
case of a supply outage or to provide additional energy in
peak demand periods. In contrast to electrical energy, en-
ergy carriers transported in pipeline systems do not neces-
sarily require distinctive storage facilities, as the pipelines
constituting the network can be used for this purpose. This
is common and well established in the gas industry, often
referred to as line pack.
Reliability evaluation of natural gas and district heating
systems has been adressed by several authors. Some studies
place emphasis on the overall system reliability, as e.g. in [1]
for natural gas and [2] for district heating applications. A
Markov-based methodology was applied in [3], analysing
the probability of the natural gas system’s supply capac-
ity falling short of the load demand. In [4] the minimum
reduction in load in a gas network due to pipeline failures
was found. The corresponding criterion for secure opera-
tion was met if pressure levels at all load points did not fall
below the respective minimum levels. None of these stud-
ies address pipeline storage, they however all refer to and
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: (+47) 73597295 Fax: (+47) 73594279
Email addresses: helseth@elkraft.ntnu.no (Arild Helseth),
g.koeppel@alumni.ethz.ch (Gaudenz Koeppel).
apply reliability evaluation methods well established in the
power system domain [5].
Pipeline storage is often claimed to have a positive im-
pact on the reliability of supply in both natural gas and
district heating systems. However, the modelling and quan-
tification of this impact has been addressed only in few
publications so far. In [6] the critical durations of pipeline
storage in a high- pressure nitrogen supply system subject
to compressor failures were analysed. Focusing on large-
scale natural gas transmission systems, [7] presents a pro-
cedure combining Monte Carlo simulations with hydraulic
transient analysis for the purpose of quantifying system re-
liability.
The most important operational characteristics of
pipeline energy systems are shortly outlined in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, focusing on gas systems. Due to the
physical characteristics of the transmission media, i.e. nat-
ural gas and hot water, a pressure or temperature increase
at the inlet of the pipeline requires a certain travelling
time to reach the outlet. Put differently, an unexpected
load increase at the pipeline outlet, cannot be satisfied im-
mediately by operator action at the pipeline inlet. Thus,
in order to prevent such load increases to be faced with
a delayed system response, the pipeline operator can pre-
pare for such events by building up an appropriate storage
in certain pipeline segments [8]. This stored energy is then
used to bridge the time required for the system and the
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media to respond in case of a load increase.
In natural gas systems, gas is stored by increasing the
inlet flow relative to the outlet flow. The additional gas ac-
cumulated in the pipeline results in a pressure increase at
both inlet and outlet. The higher inlet pressure requires
the compressor to inject at a higher pressure level, conse-
quently consuming more power. Hence, both the temporar-
ily increased inflow rate for building the line pack and, after
having done so, the operation of the pipeline at the higher
pressure level lead to increased operational costs. There-
fore, the system operator is faced with a trade-off between
risking a delayed response to load increases and higher ex-
penses for possibly unnecessarily prepared line pack.
However, operating with an additional amount of gas in
the pipeline or at a higher temperature can also have a
positive impact on the reliability of supply, even if no un-
expected load increases occur. In case of an outage of the
pipeline inlet supply, e.g. a compressor station failure or
loss of heat source, the inflow is not sufficient anymore to
meet the load demand. The energy stored in the pipeline
is then used to maintain the supply of the load until ei-
ther the minimum supply pressure or the minimum supply
temperature is reached.
This paper only focuses on the latter operation mode,
presenting a model that allows to generally analyse and
quantify the impact of pipeline storage on reliability of sup-
ply in case of an upstream failure. A Markov model is pre-
sented, suitable for analysing a basic pipeline energy sys-
tem, including different load levels.
The following section illustrates the pipeline system’s
layout and discusses the elements of theMarkovmodel. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the physical properties of the two pipeline
systems. In section 4, a case study is elaborated, and the
reliability of a natural gas system under different operating
conditions is quantified. Finally, Monte Carlo simulations
are performed in order to test the accuracy of the Markov
model.
2. Markov Modelling Approach
2.1. A Basic Markov Model
This section presents a basic approach for modelling stor-
age in pipeline energy systems. The storage in such systems
can be considered to be an assisting system, taking over
or supplementing in cases of emergencies. The storage is
charged whenever the supply exceeds the demand and it is
discharged whenever the supply falls short of the demand.
Consider the natural gas and district heating systems il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. There are generally two upstream fail-
ure modes in these systems: loss of energy supply and loss
of compressor facilities. The term energy supply is system
dependent and may refer to heat sources, gas reservoirs or
even a set of upstream pipelines. Compressors are neces-
sary to maintain the required pressure and flow rates in
order to meet the load demand in both systems depicted
in Fig. 1. In the case of district heating, an outage of the
compressor results in an almost immediate supply outage
due to the incompressibility of water. In order to focus on
the benefits of energy storage, compressor failures are not
considered in the district heating case.
In the following paragraphs, the simple natural gas trans-
mission system in Fig. 1a is used as an illustrative example.
It should be noted that the reliability model also applies to
district heating system in Fig. 1b.
ES C
R
Pin Pout
Pcrit
L
Figure 1a. A gas transmission system with an energy supply ES, an
operating compressor C and a reserve compressor R, with pipeline
inlet pressure Pin, outlet pressure Pout, critical pressure Pcrit and
load L.
CF H
R
Tin Tout
Tcrit
L
Figure 1b. A district heating transmission system with compressor
facilities CF , an operating heating unit H and a reserve heating unit
R, with pipeline inlet temperature Tin, outlet temperature Tout,
critical temperature Tcrit and load L.
The compressor station is located at the inlet or sending
end of the pipeline, comprising two compressors: the main
operating compressor (C) and the reserve compressor (R).
For the basic Markov model, only compressor C will be
considered and it is assumed that the energy supply (ES),
being e.g. a gas reservoir or a set of upstream pipelines,
is 100 % reliable. The influence and required dimension
of the reserve compressor will be discussed later-on. By
adjusting the pipeline inlet pressure (Pin) at the compressor
station, the pipeline operator can control the amount of
stored gas in the pipeline. In case C fails to operate, the
constant load (L) at the receiving end will start discharging
gas from the pipeline. It is assumed that the consumers will
not experience an outage as long as the pressure at the load
(Pout) is higher than a predefined critical pressure (Pcrit)
at the load.
The state space diagram representing the systems in
Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2. The systems are considered to be-
have as stationary Markov processes, with the correspond-
ing assumptions being discussed below. For the natural gas
system, both the compressor and the pipeline storage are
represented with binary models, i.e. the compressor can be
either in an operating state (up) or in a failed state (dn),
whereas the storage is either charged and ready for dis-
charge (up) or it is fully discharged (dn). The supply of the
load fails as soon as the system enters state 3, with both
2
the compressor having failed and the storage having been
discharged subsequently.
U up
S up
U dn
S up
U dn
S dn
U up
S dn
1
2 3
4
λU λU
µU µU
λS
µS
Figure 2. A 4-state Markov model incorporating an upstream unit
U (either a compressor or a heating unit) and the pipeline storage
S, assuming a constant load.
As the storage is defined to have failed once it is dis-
charged, the failure rate of the storage (λS) can be defined
as the inverse of the time to discharge [9]. This time can be
understood as the mean time to failure (MTTF) and de-
pends on the available compressor capacity, the load level
and the available pipeline storage. Consequently, the fail-
ure of the storage only concerns the system aspect of having
energy available or not – technical failures involved with
the storage are not considered. In order to satisfy the condi-
tions for a stationary Markov process, the load is assumed
constant during the discharge. A detailed description on
how to find the system’s survival time for a given load and
supply scenario is presented in section 3, both for gas and
district heating pipeline systems.
The model in Fig. 2 assumes that the storage is only
discharged in case of an outage of the compressor. Likewise,
the storage can only be recharged once the compressor is
operating again. The repair rate of the compressor (µU )
not only includes the physical repairing of the compressor,
but also the time required to re-establish the necessary flow
rate to reach steady state supply of the load.
The state space diagram represents a continuous and dy-
namic process as a Markov process with only 4 states. For
this model to be valid, certain assumptions were made. It
is important to note here that the purpose of the model
is to analyse the major system aspects of pipeline stor-
age. The repair rate of the compressor has to be path-
independent and hence, the transition rates from state 2 to
1 and from state 3 to 4 are identical. One could argue that
the repairing of the compressor is being started as soon
as state 2 is encountered. Thus, the repair rate from state
3 to state 4 should be comparatively higher, considering
a background repair of the compressor while discharging
the storage. However, it is possible to experience another
compressor outage when being in state 4, transiting back
to state 3. The necessary repair rate µU then again corre-
sponds to the total necessary repair duration including the
time required for re-establishing the appropriate flow rate.
Therefore, the assumption of identical repair rates can be
understood as a worst case assumption, necessary to guar-
antee path-independent transition rates.
Some assumptions are also necessary to justify the sys-
tem’s behaviour while residing in state 2, with a failed com-
pressor and discharging the pipeline storage. If the com-
pressor is repaired before the storage is fully discharged, the
system transits back to state 1, representing an operating
compressor and a fully charged storage. However, the stor-
age has been partially discharged while residing in state 2
and its charge level is actually unknown. It is therefore a
matter of mapping the continuous charge level to a binary
model. One approximation is to use discretised charge lev-
els for the storage, allowing to keep track of the momen-
tary charge state. As discussed in [9], this measure albeit
improves the accuracy of the calculations, it however does
not change the general findings and considerably increases
the number of states. Another possibility would be to have
a transition from state 2 to state 4, representing an operat-
ing compressor but defining any not fully charged storage
to be empty. Including this transition would constitute a
worst case representation of the system.
2.2. Model Extension
Natural gas and district heating systems are subject to
large variations in load throughout the day. In particular,
this holds true for natural gas pipelines serving gas-fired
power plants. This load behaviour is represented with a
load model consisting of 3 different load levels, as described
in [10]. All three load levels L1, L2 and L3 are equally likely
and satisfy L1 > L2 > L3. Load level changes are defined to
happen on an hourly basis and the different load levels L1,
L2 andL3 occur daily during α, β and γ hours, respectively.
Given that α+β+ γ = 24, the following transition rates
may be derived:
λL21 = λL31 =
α
23
λL12 = λL32 =
β
23
λL13 = λL23 =
γ
23
Combining the 3-state load model with the 4-state
pipeline model from Fig. 2, gives the 12-state Markov
model shown in Fig. 3.
According to Fig. 1, the main upstream unit is supported
by a reserve unit that is defined to be in cold stand-by, to
be switched into operation with an ideal switch. In order
to have a realistic representation of the setup, the model in
Fig. 3 is complemented with such a cold stand-by unit. This
allows us to investigate the relation between the capacity
of the reserve unit, the amount of prepared pipeline storage
and the reliability of supply. The resulting 24-state model
is not displayed here, but follows the same pattern as the
12-state model in Fig. 3. All further calculations are based
on the 24-state model.
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Figure 3. A 12-state Markov model representing one upstream unit
U (either a compressor or a heating unit), the pipeline storage S and
three load levels L1− L3.
3. Physical Characteristics
In order to find a measure of the pipeline storage survival
time and the corresponding storage failure rate, the dy-
namic responses of both a natural gas and a district heating
pipeline system are simulated. Introductory descriptions of
the physical characteristics of the two systems are given
below.
3.1. Natural Gas Systems
Natural gas is a compressible medium, and the compress-
ibility may be used by the pipeline operator to store extra
amounts of gas in the pipeline system.
Under isothermal conditions, the governing set of equa-
tions for transient flow in natural gas pipelines comprise the
state (1a), continuity (1b) and momentum (1c) equations.
The numerical method known as the method of character-
istics was applied for solving (1). The method is thoroughly
described in [11].
B =
√
zRT (1a)
B2
A
∂m
∂x
+
∂p
∂t
= 0 (1b)
∂p
∂x
+
1
A
∂m
∂t
+
pg
B2
sin(θ) +
fB2m2
2DA2p
= 0 (1c)
where:
B = acoustic wavespeed in m
S
z = compressibility factor
R = gas constant in m
2
S2K
T = temperature in K
A = cross-sectional area of pipe in m2
m= mass rate of flow in sm
3
S
x = position along pipeline in m
p = pressure in bar
t = time in S
g = gravity in m
S2
θ = angle between pipe and horizontal plane
f = friction factor
Consider a natural gas transmission pipeline as illus-
trated in Fig. 1a, working at steady state where the supply
and demand are balanced. The initial relative mass flow
(m) and pressure (p) distributions along the pipeline are
shown in Fig. 4, step 1. A sudden loss of upstream com-
pressor facilities was simulated, and the steps 2-4 in Fig. 4
show the dynamic response of the system at different time
steps. Eventually, the pressure at the pipeline outlet falls
below the critical pressure Pcrit and the system has reached
a failed state. In case Pcrit = 0.8 for the system simulated
in Fig. 4, the system’s survival time and failure rate for this
particular contingency is 1.68 hours and 0.59 hours−1, re-
spectively.
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Figure 4. Dynamic response of a gas transmission pipeline experienc-
ing a partly loss of supply. The solid-drawn line shows the relative
mass flow (m) and the stapled line shows the relative pressure (p) in
different pipeline segments. The pipeline is divided into 20 segments.
3.2. District Heating System
Studying the dynamics of energy flow in district heating
systems involves both mass flow and temperature dynam-
ics. Changes in flow are quickly transferred throughout the
whole system in the form of pressure waves, typically taking
only a few seconds. Temperature dynamics, on the other
hand, is closely related to the speed of the circulating water
4
and the travelling time from the heat producing unit to the
load may take hours. Consequently, this study only consid-
ers the loss of heat producing units, assuming that loss of
compressor facilities may be added as an independent mod-
ule in the reliability model. Temperature dynamics may be
decoupled from the flow dynamics in a quasi-dynamic pro-
cedure, as described in [12]. Transient temperature distri-
butions in district heating pipelines may be found by ap-
plying a convective transport equation, presented in (2).
∂φ
∂t
+ v
∂φ
∂x
+ aφ = 0 (2)
where:
φ= relative temperature (the difference between
temperature in the pipe and temperature of
the ground) in ◦C
t = time in S
x= position along pipeline in m
v = flow velocity in m
S
a = heat loss term in S−1
Fig. 5 illustrates the response of a 10 km district heating
transmission pipeline after partially loosing heat supply at
the inlet, decreasing the inlet temperature from 100◦C to
60◦C. The circulating speed of water was set to 1 m
S
. Even-
tually, the temperature at the pipeline outlet falls below
the critical temperature Tcrit and the system has reached
a failed state. In case Tcrit = 80
◦C, the system’s survival
time and failure rate for this particular contingency is 2.67
hours and 0.38 hours−1, respectively.
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Figure 5. Dynamic response of a district heating pipeline experiencing
a partly loss of supply. The figures show the pipeline temperature
(in ◦C) as a function of pipeline length (in 103 m) at different time
steps.
4. Case Study
The presented modelling approach was applied to a sim-
ple, but practical natural gas transmission system. It should
be noted that, once the survival times have been calculated,
the procedure is essentially the same for the district heat-
ing system in Fig. 1b.
4.1. A Natural Gas Case Study
A natural gas transmission system as illustrated in
Fig. 1a was analysed. The system has one compressor
which is normally operating, and one compressor serving
as reserve. Three load states were considered. Initially, a
reserve unit with installed capacity of 1100 MW was con-
sidered, which is sufficient to meet the demand of load
states 2 and 3, but not state 1. The physical and model
parameters are given in Table 1. Based on these parame-
ters, the corresponding storage failure rates were found as
shown in Table 2. The results are not significantly sensitive
to the storage repair rates (µs1, µs2 and µs3 in Fig. 3), and
it was assumed that the storage cannot be charged as long
as the main compressor is not operating.
Table 1
Natural gas system parameters.
Physical Parameters Model Parameters
Symbol Data Unit Symbol Data Unit
Pin 80 bar α 3 -
Pcrit 60 bar β 9 -
L1 1500 MW γ 12 -
L2 1100 MW λU 2 failures/year
L3 700 MW λR 2 failures/year
Length 100 km µU 0.10 hours
−1
Diameter 0.46 m µR 0.10 hours
−1
f 0.013 -
Table 2
Storage failure rates for the natural gas system.
SymbolCapacity [MW]Load [MW]Rate [hour−1]
λS1 0 1500 0.53
λS2 0 1100 0.33
λS3 0 700 0.26
λS4 1100 1500 0.21
Four failure states are recognised. Obviously, the three
states where both compressors are down together with an
empty storage are failure states. Furthermore, in case only
the reserve compressor is operating and the load is at its
maximum (L1), supply does not meet demand, and the
storagewill be discharged at a rateλS4 presented in Table 2.
When the storage has been fully discharged, the fourth
failure state is reached.
Solving the 24-state Markov model, the annual ex-
pected time residing in one of the four failure states is 0.78
hours/year and the corresponding frequency of being in a
failed state is 0.78 year−1.
The reliability of the system is sensitive to the frequency
of peak-load hours. By varying the number of peak-load
occurrences per day (α), the average annual outage time
and the average failure rate varied as shown in Fig. 6.
It was also of interest to investigate the impact of re-
serve unit size on the system’s reliability. In Fig. 7 the av-
erage annual outage time is presented for some reserve unit
sizes. The ability of the reserve unit to sufficiently serve the
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Figure 6. Average annual outage time and average failure rate as
functions of the number of peak load hours (α).
three load states was clearly influential on the outage time.
In addition, by increasing the reserve unit size in between
load steps, e.g. from 700 to 800 MW, the survival time was
improved, giving an improvement in reliability, as seen in
Fig. 7.
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Figure 7. Average annual outage time for different reserve unit sizes.
4.2. Model Verification
In order to evaluate the error introduced by considering
the states in Fig. 3 as memoryless, Monte Carlo simulations
following the system state transition sampling approach de-
scribed in [13] were performed. Transitions from a system
state depends randomly on the state duration of the com-
ponent or load level which departs earliest from its present
state. The data from Table 1 was applied and the contin-
uous pipeline storage level, represented as vectors of mass
flow and pressure distributions, was continously mapped
throughout the simulations.
Two simulations were run and their convergence process-
eses are shown in Fig. 8 together with a horizontal line indi-
cating the analytical result. First, the reserve unit capacity
was set to 1100 MW, which is enough to cover load states
2 and 3, but not load state 1. Running the Monte Carlo
simulation with a total simulation time of 3000 hours gave
an outage time of 0.98 hours/year, which is approximately
26 % higher than the analytical result. The system state
comprising a non-operating main compressor, an operating
reserve compressor and a charged storage will experience
storage discharge in load state 1, but not in load states 2
and 3. As the continuous charge level is not mapped in the
Markov model, switching from load state 1 to any of the
other load states will in this case reset the storage to a fully
charged state. Thus, the analytical result gave a slightly
optimistic estimate of average annual outage time.
Second, a fully redundant reserve compressor was con-
sidered. Applying a total simualtion time of 80000 years,
the gap between the simulated and the analytical result
was negligible, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 8.
For comparison, in case the effect of pipeline storage is
ignored, i.e. all storage failure rates are set equal to zero, the
resulting average annual outage time is 2.53 hours/year in
the first case and 0.046 hours/year with a fully redundant
reserve compressor.
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Figure 8. Average annual outage time as a function of number of
simulated years. The top figure refers to reserve compressor capacity
of 1100 MW, and the bottom figure to a fully redundant reserve
compressor.
5. Conclusions
The presented model serves the general purpose of ad-
dressing pipeline storage and its impact on reliability of
supply in energy pipeline systems. A Markovian approach
was chosen to quantify pipeline system reliability, and the
concepts of storage failure and repair times of a pipeline
storage were introduced.
A simple example from the natural gas domain was pre-
sented, and the average annual outage times and the aver-
age failure rates were calculated for different system con-
figurations. It was discussed how the model can be applied
to district heating systems as well. The results indicate the
significant impact of storage on reliability in large energy
pipeline systems. Comparing the analytical results from
the Markov model with Monte Carlo simulations indicated
that, altough a bit optimistic, the presented approach cap-
tures the impact of pipeline storage on reliability of supply.
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